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Generally, the problems are multifold. 1) accuracy at direct audio detection is limited and fuzzy - with best current approaches. Even matching human performan

Generally, the problems are multifold. 1) accuracy at direct audio detection is limited and fuzzy - with best current approaches. Even matching human performance at this classification task is not enough and we're not there yet. 2) the filter is supposed to take quotation and other fair use into account 3) covers and remixes make matters even more complex 4) the copyrighted matter is both performance and music itself, with different laws Therefore there will be many false positives or negatives.

candiodari 8y ago
Furthermore, adversaries get to directly test against the filter. It's like writing a computer virus. Anti-virus software does not help against even rewritten viruses because every virus writer tests every virus against every antivirus they get their hands on, and they retry, changing something, until it passes. Therefore, no antivirus ever catches a new virus. Same problem with copyright filters. Plenty of bad actors spend days, weeks or months finding (even automated) ways to bypass them.
belorn 8y ago
We have a technology that share most of the same problems but which has the opposite bias with low false positive rates: bio metric security. 1) biometric detection is limited and fuzzy - with best current approaches. Even matching human performance at this classification task is not enough. 2) biometric detection is supposed to take some natural variation into account. 3) lighting, temperature, dust and other environmental factors. No biometric security is perfect and yet it is in common use everywhere, including passports. Such design could have any rate of false positive and negatives but since the impact of false negatives is less than false positive the configuration is usually such that false positives are reduce down as much as possible, at the cost of false negatives. Can you say that the same is done with media filtering? same goes to candiodari. Do not biometric security have security testing done by adversaries, which they can retry, changing something, until it successfully break?

candiodari 8y ago

Furthermore, adversaries get to directly test against the filter. It's like writing a computer virus. Anti-virus software does not help against even rewritten viruses because every virus writer tests every virus against every antivirus they get their hands on, and they retry, changing something, until it passes. Therefore, no antivirus ever catches a new virus. Same problem with copyright filters. Plenty of bad actors spend days, weeks or months finding (even automated) ways to bypass them.

belorn 8y ago

We have a technology that share most of the same problems but which has the opposite bias with low false positive rates: bio metric security. 1) biometric detection is limited and fuzzy - with best current approaches. Even matching human performance at this classification task is not enough. 2) biometric detection is supposed to take some natural variation into account. 3) lighting, temperature, dust and other environmental factors. No biometric security is perfect and yet it is in common use everywhere, including passports. Such design could have any rate of false positive and negatives but since the impact of false negatives is less than false positive the configuration is usually such that false positives are reduce down as much as possible, at the cost of false negatives. Can you say that the same is done with media filtering? same goes to candiodari. Do not biometric security have security testing done by adversaries, which they can retry, changing something, until it successfully break?