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Disclaimer: I work on Linux at Intel. FWIW, I don't think PR had anything to do with this. Without arguing the merits of embargoes, the goal of them is to giv
by hansendc 8y ago
Disclaimer: I work on Linux at Intel.
FWIW, I don't think PR had anything to do with this. Without arguing the merits of embargoes, the goal of them is to give the good guys a head start before the bad guys. But, if you tell too many good guys, the assumption is that the bad guys find out. So, you try to tell as few good guys as possible.
This was (from my blatantly biased perspective) an honest, but imperfect attempt at keeping the bad guys from finding out. A lot of lessons have been learned since this, and the group of good guys involved in recent issues has been much more comprehensive than with the original Spectre/Meltdown bits. I think Greg was alluding to this when he said "Intel has gotten better at this."
- blihp 8y agoThe part that I find amazing about this is that Greg and Linus weren't at the top of the list of people contacted to ask 'this is a very sensitive issue and we'd like to work with you to figure out who we need to get involved in this' from a Linux standpoint. Intel has had people working on Linux support for many years now so it's not like they didn't have people on the payroll who knew the landscape and couldn't readily figure out who to contact. This reeks of incompetence at the senior management levels of Intel.
- cookiecaper 8y agoGreg and Linus are also some of the most visible participants, and as far as I understand, neither is considered particularly expert in the platform intricacies that would be involved in mitigating something like Spectre. Disclosing vulns to high-profile targets is a risky practice; their activity, both public and private, attracts a lot of attention. It makes sense to avoid that risk if possible.