It doesn't contradict what I previously said. The ability of actors to act game-theoretically depends on the bounds of the rationality and the complexity of the

It doesn't contradict what I previously said. The ability of actors to act game-theoretically depends on the bounds of the rationality and the complexity of the scenario. A game of chicken is much simpler than a game of chess, which in turn is much simpler than capitalism. The multipolar trap manifests itself in real life in lots of simple ways already. The original essay has some examples, but the tragedy of the commons is the quintessential example. The multipolar trap as a totalizing behavior is not an impossible scenario, but just currently infeasible for most sufficiently complex scenarios given the bounded reality. Which means it becomes a cause for concern as the bounds on rationality increase (through computation, through organization, etc.). That's why we should be wary of decentralized systems in the long run. What you said was "everyone" was always acting game-theoretically already and therefore that what we currently have is game-theoretically optimal, which is what I disagreed with.