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We let the market sort out whale oil. Whale oil was cheap for a long time, followed by modest price increases, followed by complete collapse of the world's whal
by vkou 8y ago
We let the market sort out whale oil. Whale oil was cheap for a long time, followed by modest price increases, followed by complete collapse of the world's whaling fleets, after which point you could not get it for any amount of money.
The current price is not the best estimate of the future rate. It is distorted by people selling below it's true cost (typically, to pay off sunk costs, or to keep the lights on in their business.)
- tptacek 8y agoCouple random counterarguments (no idea how valid): * It's hard to exclude people from whaling, so you can't "stockpile" whales. * Markets had less global visibility and insight than we have now, so it's clearer what the speculation opportunity would be. * Important financial instruments used in speculation (standardized forward and option contracts) had only recently been invented, and wouldn't be generalized out from farm commodities until after the collapse of whaling.
- vkou 8y agoThe same thing happened with the West Atlantic cod fishery collapse in the 1990s. We had a mechanism for excluding people from fishing (Catch quotas), markets had global visibility and insight, and speculative financial instruments, which by that point were quite well developed. We went from having record-breaking harvests of cod to no cod, at all. There was a collective agreement, to prevent over-harvesting of cod - and all the participants in the agreement lobbied the Canadian government to lift its restrictions (Which it did, contrary to the advice of the scientists studying cod.) A few years down the road, the fish was gone, and the fishermen went broke.
- antidesitter 8y agoThat’s the tragedy of the commons at play. It’s caused by incentives that arise from a shared-resource system. The solution is to (1) internalize the externalities and (2) allow individuals to take over the property rights of a resource, i.e. privatize it. This shifts the game-theoretic equilibrium away from resource depletion.
- vkou 8y ago> allow individuals to take over the property rights of a resource, i.e. privatize it At what price? If the state owns land with a billion barrels of tar sands oil on it, should they sell it for $1/barrel? $2/barrel? Should it accept the highest bid that the market will put forward? What if the state sat on the land for 10 years - would it get a better bid then? Maybe it makes sense to wait until the time is right to privatize? Deciding when, and for how much, to put resource-bearing land onto the market is a highly political, non-market-driven process. You can't just say 'privatize it', and hope that markets will find the optimal outcome. (Optimal for whom?) Setting the right level of royalties, or, alternatively, privatization for any particular point in time is an incredibly complicated economic question.
- antidesitter 8y ago> At what price? That is a great question. There are various types of auction systems that can be used. See [1] for an overview. > If the state owns land with a billion barrels of tar sands oil on it, should they sell it for $1/barrel? $2/barrel? Should it accept the lowest bid that the market will put forward? Why would they accept the lowest bid? Typically in an auction one accepts the highest bid (except a Vickrey auction, where the price paid is the second-highest bid). This is particularly true in the context of privatization because resources should be allocated to those who value them most and thus have the strongest incentive to use them efficiently [1]. > What if the state sat on the land for 10 years - would it get a better bid then? Maybe it makes sense to wait until the time is right to privatize? It depends on the government's goals. The underlying assumption of privatization is that markets are better resource managers than central planners (e.g. due to the price mechanism solving the economic calculation problem). If a government wants to maximize efficient allocation of ownership rights, then it should privatize as quickly as possible using one of the aforementioned approaches. If a government just wants to maximize revenue for themselves (see Venezuela), well, then anything goes. > Deciding when, and for how much, to put resource-bearing land onto the market is a highly political, non-market-driven process. The issue is indeed highly political. However, it is by definition also market-driven. Unless by "non-market-driven" you meant not exclusively market driven, in which case I would agree. > You can't just say 'privatize it', and hope that markets will find the optimal outcome. (Optimal for whom?) Optimal for society at large, through efficient allocation of ownership rights. We do not have to rely on "hope" since there is a lot of empirical and theoretical evidence that markets are better resource-managers than governments. [1] https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-642-60825-4_5 https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-642-60825-...