The original motion makes a more nuanced argument than this thread gives credit for. In particular, the motion does not claim that border searches in general ar

The original motion makes a more nuanced argument than this thread gives credit for. In particular, the motion does not claim that border searches in general are unconstitutional. It makes a much finer scoped claim that: without individualized criminal suspicion, the off-site search of an electronic device taken at a border is unconstitutional. No such suspicion of ongoing or imminent criminal activity existed in the case of Ms. Lazoja giving rise to reasonable suspicion to search and seize her property. Consequently, neither was there probable cause, nor a warrant. Therefore, the search and seizure of Ms. Lazoja’s property violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment. To make this argument, the motion mentions some precedent. Most notably was United States v. Kim (page 12): In Kim, where DHS agents seized a laptop computer at Los Angeles International Airport and later sent it to a laboratory to be copied and searched, the district court found that the lengthy post-seizure retention of a laptop at a second site, outside the airport, “did not possess the characteristics of a border search or other regular inspection procedures,” and that it “more resembled the common nonborder search based on individualized suspicion, which must be prefaced by the usual warrant and probable cause standards.” Id. at 58 (citing United States v. Brennan, 538 F.2d 711, 716 (5th Cir. 1976)). The court in Kim questioned whether the seizure and imaging of a laptop at the border “can accurately be characterized as a border search at all.” And furthermore that doing so for a cell-phone is particularly egregious; recent supreme court cases strengthen the argument that if we're going to protect laptops then we certainly need to protect cellphones (page 13): The Supreme Court recently expanded the categorically heightened privacy interests in data located on cell phones, specifically addressing cell phones’ location data. The motion also makes auxiliary arguments about retention and duration: even if the border search was constitutional, shipping the device off to a lab was not constitutional without a warrant. And even if shipping the device to a lab was constitutional, retaining it for so long was not constitutional. And even if retaining the device for so long was constitutional, retaining the data indefinitely is not constitutional. At least, not without warrants.