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"Jane Doe and John Does 1-2 provided Ms. Lazoja a receipt (No. 1199376) dated February 26, 2018, documenting CBP’s seizure of her iPhone and SIM Card, and indic

"Jane Doe and John Does 1-2 provided Ms. Lazoja a receipt (No. 1199376) dated February 26, 2018, documenting CBP’s seizure of her iPhone and SIM Card, and indicating the iPhone and SIM Card were “Sent to DHS Lab.” (Rejhane Aff. ¶ 27); see Ex. A." They took her phone and retained it for 130 days. Presumably, during that time they copied all of the data off of the phone (and perhaps also decypted that data). Regardless, the plaintiff argues that keeping the phone for that period of time without a warrant was unconstitutional in the first place.

chimeracoder 8y ago
> They took her phone and retained it for 130 days. Presumably, during that time they copied all of the data off of the phone (and perhaps also decypted that data). My understanding is that the data can't be (feasibly) extracted and decrypted from a modern iPhone, though. Isn't that why the FBI made such a big fuss about Apple not "cooperating" to backdoor devices? I understand the argument about the seizure being unconstitutional, but I'm talking strictly about the cryptographic aspects here.
- throwawayjava 8y ago
  > My understanding is that the data can't be (feasibly) extracted and decrypted from a modern iPhone, though. https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2018/02/26/government-can-access-any-apple-iphone-cellebrite/#7617a145667a https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2018/02/26/gover... Also, the motion requests: Plaintiff Rejhane Lazoja respectfully asks this Court to order Defendants to return her Data, to expunge any copies made of the Data, to disclose all third parties who received and/or retain copies, partial or complete, of the Data, and to provide information about the basis for the seizure and retention of the property. If the judge grants all of these requests, it will be interesting to watch what happens with the request: ...return her Data... If it comes to this, I hope the plaintiff asks the court to know whether the data was decrypted. I.e., if you decrypted my data, you need to return that to me. The original image doesn't suffice. Maybe "correspondence with council" is the groundwork for this later request? I.e., something along the lines of "I have a right to know what the government now knows about my private correspondence with my council." The "partial or complete" portion of the request is also relevant for answering this question: the information is legally relevant (and the request reasonable) because some of the correspondence was between the plaintiff and her council, and also because if they shared partial information that almost certainly means they were able to decrypt the data. The govt's response to the timeframe arguments will also certainly leak some information about the government's capabilities; e.g., I imagine the gov't will argue that 130 days was necessary in order to execute the search, and/or that they need to retain the data so that they might one day be able to execute the search.
- jstarfish 8y ago
  > Isn't that why the FBI made such a big fuss about Apple not "cooperating" to backdoor devices? They did a hell of a spin job grandstanding about the "impossibility" of cracking iPhones (protip: it never has been), but the FBI only made a stink about it because they can't crack the phones without paying Cellebrite a ton of money to develop new 0-days, which in the end is exactly what they ended up having to do. If Apple would factory-backdoor the things, the FBI could crack them themselves. Every LE department has been handing seized iPhones over to Cellebrite for years for important enough cases. LE don't want to have to rely on a third-party (and foreign) contractor with a service monopoly anymore.
- wepple 8y ago
  There are commercial tools for breaking iPhones. For example, $15k buys you 300 unlocks with this: https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2018/03/05/apple-iphone-x-graykey-hack/#323eddcd2950 https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2018/03/05/apple... Of course, it’s Cat and mouse and I believe Apple will or already have squashed that. The iPhone is the most secure consumer mobile device, but not bulletproof

chimeracoder 8y ago

> They took her phone and retained it for 130 days. Presumably, during that time they copied all of the data off of the phone (and perhaps also decypted that data). My understanding is that the data can't be (feasibly) extracted and decrypted from a modern iPhone, though. Isn't that why the FBI made such a big fuss about Apple not "cooperating" to backdoor devices? I understand the argument about the seizure being unconstitutional, but I'm talking strictly about the cryptographic aspects here.

throwawayjava 8y ago
> My understanding is that the data can't be (feasibly) extracted and decrypted from a modern iPhone, though. https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2018/02/26/government-can-access-any-apple-iphone-cellebrite/#7617a145667a https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2018/02/26/gover... Also, the motion requests: Plaintiff Rejhane Lazoja respectfully asks this Court to order Defendants to return her Data, to expunge any copies made of the Data, to disclose all third parties who received and/or retain copies, partial or complete, of the Data, and to provide information about the basis for the seizure and retention of the property. If the judge grants all of these requests, it will be interesting to watch what happens with the request: ...return her Data... If it comes to this, I hope the plaintiff asks the court to know whether the data was decrypted. I.e., if you decrypted my data, you need to return that to me. The original image doesn't suffice. Maybe "correspondence with council" is the groundwork for this later request? I.e., something along the lines of "I have a right to know what the government now knows about my private correspondence with my council." The "partial or complete" portion of the request is also relevant for answering this question: the information is legally relevant (and the request reasonable) because some of the correspondence was between the plaintiff and her council, and also because if they shared partial information that almost certainly means they were able to decrypt the data. The govt's response to the timeframe arguments will also certainly leak some information about the government's capabilities; e.g., I imagine the gov't will argue that 130 days was necessary in order to execute the search, and/or that they need to retain the data so that they might one day be able to execute the search.
jstarfish 8y ago
> Isn't that why the FBI made such a big fuss about Apple not "cooperating" to backdoor devices? They did a hell of a spin job grandstanding about the "impossibility" of cracking iPhones (protip: it never has been), but the FBI only made a stink about it because they can't crack the phones without paying Cellebrite a ton of money to develop new 0-days, which in the end is exactly what they ended up having to do. If Apple would factory-backdoor the things, the FBI could crack them themselves. Every LE department has been handing seized iPhones over to Cellebrite for years for important enough cases. LE don't want to have to rely on a third-party (and foreign) contractor with a service monopoly anymore.
wepple 8y ago
There are commercial tools for breaking iPhones. For example, $15k buys you 300 unlocks with this: https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2018/03/05/apple-iphone-x-graykey-hack/#323eddcd2950 https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2018/03/05/apple... Of course, it’s Cat and mouse and I believe Apple will or already have squashed that. The iPhone is the most secure consumer mobile device, but not bulletproof