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Likewise, I was trying to figure this out. And haven’t yet. In most prediction markets the reason for centralization is as the market maker or arbiter. For exam
by prepend 8y ago
Likewise, I was trying to figure this out. And haven’t yet. In most prediction markets the reason for centralization is as the market maker or arbiter. For example predictit.com will definitively say if some testified or not during the market term [0]. So arguments over what testifying means get handled fairly.
In augur the community seems to determine this based on how much they spend to reconcile the transaction. So lots of people could tip the scale. On big tickets this would likely attract attention, but on smaller items it could be a problem unless members of the community have reputation and identities.
It seems like, from reading the faq [1], that it really just boils down to a proof of stake consensus method with multiple rounds of dispute before and after a market is finalized. With a documented fork procedure. So if consensus gets manipulated, it is very clear and the market itself loses reputation through that they tried to design in their fork process. But would also get likely checked by a “hard fork” away from whomever is running that particular blockchain and manipulating accounts.
The “ethics arbitrage” opportunity would be to look for markets where the outcome is realistically fuzzy “did someone lie” or has an invalid outcome and tip the scales without detection.
[0] https://www.predictit.org/Contract/9262/Will-Trump-testify-to-special-counsel-in-2018#data https://www.predictit.org/Contract/9262/Will-Trump-testify-t...
[1] https://docs.augur.net/#tentative-outcome https://docs.augur.net/#tentative-outcome
- JackFr 8y agoYeah, so I read the white paper -- fairly closely at first, but as I got bogged down in the details of 'first public reporter' and the formula for the size of the 'dispute bond' and disputes etc., it became very clear that despite all of the thought and hard work that went into this, that the link between the real world and the reported outcome is reliant on trust and community norms. And the more one thinks about it the more obvious it becomes. Two ways to think about it: 1) The initial market is betting on an outcome -- how is that different from the dispute resolution phase, which can also be reduced to betting on an outcome. 2) Imagine a purely imaginary event -- and read the whitepaper with that in mind. All of the the processes set up still function perfectly -- as designed. In fact there is no need of a real event. So if there is no need for a real event, why is there an impetus to report a real outcome even if there is a real event. That isn't to say it can't work, but if it does it will be through trust and community norms, not Ethereum.