3 ms·

> in short, MCUs are not secure devices I doubt there is 100% secure device, you know, it's all about tradeoffs. Given enough time and resources, nearly anythi

> in short, MCUs are not secure devices I doubt there is 100% secure device, you know, it's all about tradeoffs. Given enough time and resources, nearly anything can be hacked. By the way, if an attacker has gained physical access to the primary token (and also to the another factor, a password, since token on its own is not too helpful), they don't need to hack it in any way: they can just use it to log into the account, add some other token and revoke the existing one.

jiveturkey 8y ago
> I doubt there is 100% secure device, you might want to read up on EAL certification. Yes, there is no 100% secure device, but "secure" is about resistance to attack and an actual secure element is very resistant, as well as tamper evident. u2f-zero could be hacked in 10s flat if you prep ahead of time. > if an attacker has gained physical access to the primary token ... they don't need to hack it in any way but they need long term access. with this device, short term access is enough to learn the key and then i can get access at a time of my choosing. i can also learn the counter value and you won't notice that i have gained access.
- conorpp 8y ago
  Yes using a normal MCU for U2F is a bit of a compromise since EAL chips are unobtainium. So flash read protection is the main barrier to physical cloning methods. I'm not sure of any methods to bypass the read protection on normal MCUs in a 10s "drive by" attack. AFAIK, the special companies that provide flash readout (http://www.break-ic.com/ http://www.break-ic.com/), do so by decapping the chip and using involved imaging techniques. I suspect they get good at identifying various flash technologies, many of which are common to many chips. But don't think it's feasible for a drive by. The I2C eavesdropping shouldn't be an issue because the ATECC508A does apply a mask.
- dimonomid 8y ago
  > you won't notice that i have gained access. If I lose my primary token, how can I not notice that? I look at it a few times per day, and I use it not rarely either, so I can't see how I can not notice if I lose it (even if it was replaced by the similarly-looking device).

jiveturkey 8y ago

> I doubt there is 100% secure device, you might want to read up on EAL certification. Yes, there is no 100% secure device, but "secure" is about resistance to attack and an actual secure element is very resistant, as well as tamper evident. u2f-zero could be hacked in 10s flat if you prep ahead of time. > if an attacker has gained physical access to the primary token ... they don't need to hack it in any way but they need long term access. with this device, short term access is enough to learn the key and then i can get access at a time of my choosing. i can also learn the counter value and you won't notice that i have gained access.

conorpp 8y ago
Yes using a normal MCU for U2F is a bit of a compromise since EAL chips are unobtainium. So flash read protection is the main barrier to physical cloning methods. I'm not sure of any methods to bypass the read protection on normal MCUs in a 10s "drive by" attack. AFAIK, the special companies that provide flash readout (http://www.break-ic.com/ http://www.break-ic.com/), do so by decapping the chip and using involved imaging techniques. I suspect they get good at identifying various flash technologies, many of which are common to many chips. But don't think it's feasible for a drive by. The I2C eavesdropping shouldn't be an issue because the ATECC508A does apply a mask.
dimonomid 8y ago
> you won't notice that i have gained access. If I lose my primary token, how can I not notice that? I look at it a few times per day, and I use it not rarely either, so I can't see how I can not notice if I lose it (even if it was replaced by the similarly-looking device).