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You still require trust with the paper ballots, there are multiple threat models: - System needs to ensure everyone votes only once - Ensure each person meets

You still require trust with the paper ballots, there are multiple threat models: - System needs to ensure everyone votes only once - Ensure each person meets the qualifications to vote - Ensure ballots cannot be counterfeit or additional ballots inserted somehow - Ensure votes are confidential throughout the process - Ensure voters cannot prove their votes to others - Ensure the people counting are trusted or the results checked / verified - Ensure all ballots are actually counted One significant negative with the paper ballot method is that voters cannot confirm the last point. I have no way of confirming that my ballot was actually counted and contributed to the final tally's.

foepys 8y ago
To attack paper ballots you need people. Like thousands of people working with you to manipulate important elections directly at the source. With electronic voting, you potentially need a single person with a computer on the other side of the globe exploiting a security flaw, that will inevitably be there. Whoever claims to write bug free software is a conman. I also don't want to be able to verify my vote. If I can, that means that somebody else also can. Given how tech-illiterate the average human is, voting crypto keys will be littered all around the internet.
- aeternus 8y ago
  >I also don't want to be able to verify my vote. If I can, that means that somebody else also can. Given how tech-illiterate the average human is, voting crypto keys will be littered all around the internet. Right, I should have been more clear. You typically do want voters to be able to prove that they voted and that their vote was counted, but you do not want voters to be able to prove the contents of their vote (who they voted for).
DennisP 8y ago
Some kinda famous cryptographers have designed verifiable paper voting systems: https://rangevoting.org/RivSmiPRshort.html https://rangevoting.org/RivSmiPRshort.html https://rangevoting.org/RivSmiAnswers.html https://rangevoting.org/RivSmiAnswers.html https://rangevoting.org/SleatorCheapo.html https://rangevoting.org/SleatorCheapo.html
- votepaunchy 8y ago
  ThreeBallot was broken (and the fix unworkable). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ThreeBallot#Broken_Encryption https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ThreeBallot#Broken_Encryption
  - DennisP 8y ago
    Thanks, didn't know that. What about the other variants?
icebraining 8y ago
It doesn't scale to every voter, but in my country anyone can request to witness the opening of the local sealed boxes and the subsequent count.
gruez 8y ago
>- Ensure voters cannot prove their votes to others >- Ensure all ballots are actually counted aren't these two contradictory?
- throwawaymath 8y ago
  I believe aeternus means proving the contents of the vote, not simply that they voted. In that case, no, they're not contradictory.
- deleted 8y ago
  [deleted]
kosievdmerwe 8y ago
Pretty much all those points apply with electronic voting too. With electronic voting I pretty much lose the ability to verify my vote wasn't changed. With paper I can achieve a high level of confidence that a significant number of votes didn't get changed as lots of people with opposing interests are watching each other. With electronic voting: - I can't read the code since it's likely closed source (and not many people can read code) - Even if it's open source I can't verify that the code I verified is running the code I verified. A USB port is a security risk, any printout can be forged and finally I certainly wouldn't be allowed to inspect the machine's insides. And this is ignoring all the other code on the machine in stuff like the touch screen controller etc. - So given that the code is a blackbox, I can't verify that my vote hasn't been changed silently, especially since the crypto token I'm given doesn't allow me to verify my vote. Whereas, with paper ballots, the average person is able to understand the risks and be able to mitigate them. Especially, since you'll have people with opposing votes trying to find the other side cheat. Elections are too important and people are motivated to try and hack them, since the likelihood of getting caught hacking is much smaller than the massive effort you'd need to materially affect a paper ballot.

foepys 8y ago

To attack paper ballots you need people. Like thousands of people working with you to manipulate important elections directly at the source. With electronic voting, you potentially need a single person with a computer on the other side of the globe exploiting a security flaw, that will inevitably be there. Whoever claims to write bug free software is a conman. I also don't want to be able to verify my vote. If I can, that means that somebody else also can. Given how tech-illiterate the average human is, voting crypto keys will be littered all around the internet.

aeternus 8y ago
>I also don't want to be able to verify my vote. If I can, that means that somebody else also can. Given how tech-illiterate the average human is, voting crypto keys will be littered all around the internet. Right, I should have been more clear. You typically do want voters to be able to prove that they voted and that their vote was counted, but you do not want voters to be able to prove the contents of their vote (who they voted for).

DennisP 8y ago

Some kinda famous cryptographers have designed verifiable paper voting systems: https://rangevoting.org/RivSmiPRshort.html https://rangevoting.org/RivSmiPRshort.html https://rangevoting.org/RivSmiAnswers.html https://rangevoting.org/RivSmiAnswers.html https://rangevoting.org/SleatorCheapo.html https://rangevoting.org/SleatorCheapo.html

votepaunchy 8y ago
ThreeBallot was broken (and the fix unworkable). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ThreeBallot#Broken_Encryption https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ThreeBallot#Broken_Encryption
- DennisP 8y ago
  Thanks, didn't know that. What about the other variants?

icebraining 8y ago

It doesn't scale to every voter, but in my country anyone can request to witness the opening of the local sealed boxes and the subsequent count.

gruez 8y ago

>- Ensure voters cannot prove their votes to others >- Ensure all ballots are actually counted aren't these two contradictory?

throwawaymath 8y ago
I believe aeternus means proving the contents of the vote, not simply that they voted. In that case, no, they're not contradictory.
deleted 8y ago
[deleted]

kosievdmerwe 8y ago

Pretty much all those points apply with electronic voting too. With electronic voting I pretty much lose the ability to verify my vote wasn't changed. With paper I can achieve a high level of confidence that a significant number of votes didn't get changed as lots of people with opposing interests are watching each other. With electronic voting: - I can't read the code since it's likely closed source (and not many people can read code) - Even if it's open source I can't verify that the code I verified is running the code I verified. A USB port is a security risk, any printout can be forged and finally I certainly wouldn't be allowed to inspect the machine's insides. And this is ignoring all the other code on the machine in stuff like the touch screen controller etc. - So given that the code is a blackbox, I can't verify that my vote hasn't been changed silently, especially since the crypto token I'm given doesn't allow me to verify my vote. Whereas, with paper ballots, the average person is able to understand the risks and be able to mitigate them. Especially, since you'll have people with opposing votes trying to find the other side cheat. Elections are too important and people are motivated to try and hack them, since the likelihood of getting caught hacking is much smaller than the massive effort you'd need to materially affect a paper ballot.