3 ms·
>Elections should also not allow someone to verify how they voted after the fact. Why not? I'd like to know that my ballot was counted properly. And that ever
by SilasX 8y ago
>Elections should also not allow someone to verify how they voted after the fact.
Why not? I'd like to know that my ballot was counted properly.
And that everyone whose vote was counted was a valid voter.
And that everyone whose vote was counted, was counted how they intended (but not the content).
You're right if you mean that some of those desirable properties might be irreconcilable, but that's not the same as saying I shouldn't be able to validate correct counting outright; that's exactly what allows votes to be changed after the fact.
IIRC, it is possible to use homomorphic encryption to get all of that and have an end-to-end auditable system that maintains differential privacy (impossibility of detecting a change in the outcome by removing one vote). But I don't know the details of such a system.
- monocasa 8y agoBecause you open yourself to vote buying and voter intimidation attacks. Imagine a sketchy untraceable site on tor that'll give $20 for every public key that voted "the correct" way. During the gilded age, voter buying was a particularly bad problem, so we have a history of this attack in the united states.
- SilasX 8y agoYes, I understand the concept of selling votes. That wasn't in dispute. But in that case, your objection is to "being able to prove to others that you voted one way". Not to "being able to prove to yourself that you were counted as voting one way". Equating the two makes to harder to evaluate what is and isn't possible with different schemes like e.g. homomorphic systems.
- monocasa 8y agoIf you can prove to yourself, you can prove to others. They just ask for your key in exchange for the kickback.
- SilasX 8y agoThat does not follow at all: there are deniable encryption schemes that can decrypt to one or another message depending on which key is used. There are zero-knowledge proof systems that can convince exactly one person of a claim but not others (because the one person chose random challenges that others' can't trust not to have been revealed in advance) Be careful what assumptions you're depending on!
- kenhwang 8y agoIdeally, you'd want to be able to verify your vote was counted correctly, but not be able to determine whether a specific individual voted a certain way. It's so you can't feasibly sell your vote; it's one thing to say you voted a certain way, it's another to prove you actually did it. It's also to protect the voter against retaliation; imagine if the government can discriminate based on how you voted. You can always destroy paper ballots; it's difficult to destroy public blockchain ledgers.
- SilasX 8y ago>Ideally, you'd want to be able to verify your vote was counted correctly, but not be able to determine whether a specific individual voted a certain way. It's so you can't feasibly sell your vote; it's one thing to say you voted a certain way, it's another to prove you actually did it. Right -- my point was that the parent was equating the two, but that's throwing the baby out with the bathwater. It's great that you can't prove to others how you voted, but not if it allows a third party to overwrite your vote without your knowledge!