2 ms·
If it's impossible to prove that you've set up the second password, they can't reasonably demand that you provide it if you deny that it exists. They could unr
by caconym_ 8y ago
If it's impossible to prove that you've set up the second password, they can't reasonably demand that you provide it if you deny that it exists.
They could unreasonably demand a working second password and incarcerate/torture you until you either provide one or die, but that's the next level.
- cryptonector 8y agoLEO and courts will (reasonably!) make the following inference: "MIGHT be another password-protected partition" -> "is a password-protected partition"
- caconym_ 8y agoHow does the Truecrypt version of this idea work? I was under the impression that the double-secret data were written in such a way as to be indistinguishable from random bits that normally appear in the files that contain encrypted volumes, with no metadata (e.g. a partition table) to suggest that those random bits are actually interesting. I figure there is at least one good reason to include amenable "filler" in a "single-secret" file containing encrypted data: it means the size of the plaintext data cannot be inferred from the size of the file. So there is plausible deniability for having amenable "random" data present on that basis alone. I'm not saying it's easy to extend this scheme to accommodate all environments and/or user experiences. As you say, you can't just e.g. have another partition sitting around full of nothing but suspicious random data.