3 ms·
Backside covering at the cheapest possible price is the goal. It's not about whether it achieves the regulatory goal, just whether it gets a check on the list.
by tialaramex 8y ago
Backside covering at the cheapest possible price is the goal. It's not about whether it achieves the regulatory goal, just whether it gets a check on the list.
The previous iteration of backside covering pondered the unencrypted server certificate, on the rationale that if this is a bad guy why do they have a good guy's certificate.
If you know any cryptography, you are now thinking "But, wait, how does that secure anything?" but you aren't the target customer. The target customer verifies that this blocks them from accessing a "Bad" site in Internet Explorer and they're happy to part with $$ instead of the $$$ it would cost to do full blown HTTPS proxy for every connection.
In TLS 1.3 this server certificate is encrypted. So the (perhaps slightly more untrustworthy) client SNI is pondered instead.
What middlebox vendors would prefer not to mention is that in many cases they also figured TLS re-connections are always safe and can be allowed through. After all, if they didn't let bad guys make the original connection, how could those bad guys re-connect? TLS 1.3 exploited this to be "backward compatible" with such crapware, it says all its connections are "reconnections" so they pass through unmolested...