4 ms·

> Some crypto funcs now randomly read an extra byte Can someone explain how this is a feature?

• mirekrusin 8y ago
  Timing attack prevention?
• ancarda 8y ago
  It’s so tests don’t rely on behavior that may change. See this commit message for a full explanation: https://github.com/golang/go/commit/6269dcdc24d74379d8a609ce886149811020b2cc https://github.com/golang/go/commit/6269dcdc24d74379d8a609ce...
• kibibu 8y ago
  It's to stop people misusing the crypto APIs, or making assumptions about them that the Go maintainers don't want to be stuck supporting. https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/64451 https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/64451 > Code has ended up depending on things like RSA's key generation being deterministic given a fixed random Reader. This was never guaranteed and would prevent us from ever changing anything about it.
  • rauhl 8y ago
    I respect agl a lot, but this really doesn’t make sense to me. Should I be able to rely on the RSA keygen being deterministic between versions, given a fixed random Reader? No. But should I be able to rely on it being deterministic between runs with the same version? IMHO, yes. This changes the signature of key generation from (Reader) to (Reader, internal random).