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I'm no u2f expert (actually this article gave most of my knowledge about u2f) but imho there's a small security problem? The author says: "This way, the count
by znpy 8y ago
I'm no u2f expert (actually this article gave most of my knowledge about u2f) but imho there's a small security problem?
The author says:
"This way, the counter range of the primary token is [0, 2097151], while the counter range of the backup is [2000000000, 2002097151]. The fact that those ranges don't intersect ensures that once backup token is used on some service, the primary one is invalidated for good."
But... If my understanding is correct, the counter value is stored both on the server and the token. The server rejects authentication IF the value of counter provided is less than the value of counter stored server-side.
This means that every server (service) stores a different value of the counter.
Doesn't this mean that using the backup token only invalidates the main token for the single service for which the backup token it's being used?
The main (compromised) token will stay perfectly usable on all the services except for those where we manually disabled the main (compromised) token.
Am I correct in this?
- znpy 8y agoThere should be a way to invalidate a token on all services in a single time. Maybe service providers could provide an https endpoint to perform this? It might be a good idea to give a distinct well-known name to this kind of endpoints, and provide such endpoints in the registration email so that when a token is to be invalidated, an user can regexp-search the well-known name of the endpoint in their mailbox, retrieve all such endpoints and invalidate the compromised token against all of them.
- jiveturkey 8y ago> Maybe service providers could provide an https endpoint to perform this? That's a good idea, with one caveat. It needs to be quite hard to revoke a token. Proof of 1-factor is not sufficient; an attacker could then simply revoke your token and then gain access. So a lost token is quite a challenge, even if there is a revoke URL. This doesn't seem automatable (to revoke all "in a single time" as you say). > provide such endpoints in the registration email In addition, the browser should record U2F interactions and know all sites on which a token was registered. Then such a list is very easily accessible, as long as the browser log is available. If it isn't, well you have email as a backup log. The fact that you can't unilaterally revoke all token registrations is the main weakness of U2F. (besides the cost and the user action required for uptake of it)
- dimonomid 8y agoYes sure, once the primary token is lost, the backup should be used to login into all of the services we used the primary one for. But it's not worse than if we had a regular U2F token as a backup: we'd have, again, to login to all services and revoke the primary token manually.
- znpy 8y agoYes I agree. It's not really a security problem. My bad, should have worded it better.