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I don't know what makes you miss the point, but ok, let me repeat. With the regular second U2F device it has to be easily accessible (e.g. at home in my sleepin

I don't know what makes you miss the point, but ok, let me repeat. With the regular second U2F device it has to be easily accessible (e.g. at home in my sleeping room). With the proposed solution, it doesn't have to be easily accessible. > it still recommends storing the 2nd token at home In the article I mention that I can either bury it somewhere in the forest or brick up into the wall. Even if we ignore the forest part, do you consider "bricking up into the wall" and just keeping in sleeping room as the same thing, even it's my home's wall? If you do, then ok, sorry for wasting your time, we're not going to agree. Because I believe that making the token really hard to access (like having to disassemble the actual wall a little bit) does make the token a lot more secure. And another important point that with the regular token I have to add it to every new service manually. Which can be not trivial if I'm traveling far from home. And I can just forget, etc etc.

akerl_ 8y ago
If someone is in my home looking for my U2F key, they've bridged the gap between the threat model I'm concerned with and the model where they're clearly motivated enough that putting the key in brick isn't going to stop them. Furthermore, I don't really like the prospect of having to take a sledgehammer to my wall when I drop my U2F key during a trip. Personally, I have a couple U2F tokens and OTP on my phone, with recovery codes. If I register for a new site when I'm on the road, it gets my travel U2F and phone OTP. When I get home, I pair up the 2nd U2F and drop the recovery codes in the box with the rest of them.
- dimonomid 8y ago
  First, if the token is easily accessible, then they can steal it even if they don't actually look for it. Like, steal "accidentally". Second, obscurity here is an important part of the security: you don't have to tell anyone that you have a token in the wall, so even if they came specifically for the token, they can surely look for it in your home (because the majority of people store backup token just at home), but it's a lot less likely that they start break walls (unless they specifically know it's there). So here, the level of security is up to the token owner. As to having to take a sledgehammer: well, losing a token is an emergency situation and I just try hard not to lose it. But if I do, I still have a way out, and breaking a wall a little is still a lot better than losing the access to my accounts.

akerl_ 8y ago

If someone is in my home looking for my U2F key, they've bridged the gap between the threat model I'm concerned with and the model where they're clearly motivated enough that putting the key in brick isn't going to stop them. Furthermore, I don't really like the prospect of having to take a sledgehammer to my wall when I drop my U2F key during a trip. Personally, I have a couple U2F tokens and OTP on my phone, with recovery codes. If I register for a new site when I'm on the road, it gets my travel U2F and phone OTP. When I get home, I pair up the 2nd U2F and drop the recovery codes in the box with the rest of them.

dimonomid 8y ago
First, if the token is easily accessible, then they can steal it even if they don't actually look for it. Like, steal "accidentally". Second, obscurity here is an important part of the security: you don't have to tell anyone that you have a token in the wall, so even if they came specifically for the token, they can surely look for it in your home (because the majority of people store backup token just at home), but it's a lot less likely that they start break walls (unless they specifically know it's there). So here, the level of security is up to the token owner. As to having to take a sledgehammer: well, losing a token is an emergency situation and I just try hard not to lose it. But if I do, I still have a way out, and breaking a wall a little is still a lot better than losing the access to my accounts.