For reference, here is the part of the blog where the attack is explained: > Putting this all together, if Chuck replaces one of the points Alice and Bob send

For reference, here is the part of the blog where the attack is explained: > Putting this all together, if Chuck replaces one of the points Alice and Bob send each other, (x, y), with (x, 0), then Alice or Bob multiplies it by their secret key, there’s a 50% chance they get the point at infinity and a 50% chance they get (x, 0). If Chuck replaces both intermediate messages, there’s a 25% chance that Alice and Bob agree the secret key is the point at infinity, and no chance they agree on any other key. This means either ECDH fails and Alice and Bob have to retry (giving Chuck another chance), or Chuck knows the secret key and can read and insert messages. tl;dr replace a thing with 0 and watch a cluster of screwups happen. You can probably learn a very limited amount of cryptography or math and, simply knowing that this behavior exists, find invalid curve point vulnerabilities in deployed cryptographic code.