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After the Bush vs. Gore election problems in 2000, I recall a paper here on HN of a study of different voting mechanisms. I think it was an MIT study - if anybo

by Isamu 8y ago

After the Bush vs. Gore election problems in 2000, I recall a paper here on HN of a study of different voting mechanisms. I think it was an MIT study - if anybody knows the paper, please post. Anyway the conclusion was that all systems have some non-zero error rate, but the most reliable was paper ballots with optical readers. Ability to audit was important too. So this paper was discussed here and I thought it might make some impact on the voting systems in the US. After all, I thought, here we had a credible study, the merits were being discussed, and so on. Of course what happened was that my state (PA) adopted all electronic systems, with poor audit trail, etc. I don't think any legislature anywhere made a good faith effort to weigh the possible options in a rational way. I think the vendors came in, gave a presentation, and the everybody went with their gut feel.

Shivetya 8y ago
well if anything it shows that you cannot trust paper ballots or that in a close contest no one will. electronic voting will work provided you can take a record of your vote, say a bar code, and scan it and verify your vote was recorded properly. so give them a paper copy with their votes printed out and a code they can scan either at home, their phone, any government facility, that says - yeah it counted. when it comes to bulk counting the electronic version is used or a printout of every single bar code value is mass scanned back in. how else can you have a paper ballot that cannot be altered?
- tobylane 8y ago
  What’s the it that shows you can’t trust paper? Votes being edited isn’t a fear here. We write with pencils in fear of disappearing ink but the whole counting process is monitored by the candidates, with no claims of vote editing.
- jacques_chester 8y ago
  > how else can you have a paper ballot that cannot be altered? With simple, boring techniques requiring the presence of multiple scrutineers appointed by different candidates. The process relies on mutual suspicion to detect problems at every step. In an Australian election, all ballot boxes are numbered. The seals are also numbered. When a ballot box is assembled, the seal numbers and box number are logged, signed by the senior Electoral Officer present and countersigned by at least two scrutineers appointed by different candidates. Ballots are not numbered, but are counted as they are dispensed. Each is initialled by the official who hands it to the voter. This process is observable by scrutineers. When time comes to count, the box numbers are cross-checked with the logs, again under scrutineers. When the ballots are hand-counted, it happens with scrutineers watching. When the tallies are made, it happens with scrutineers present. When any of the scrutineers disagrees with some aspect of the process, they can appeal to the electoral commission. If they're dissatisfied, the matter can be taken to the Court of Disputed Returns. So far as I am aware, only once, in over a century of Australian elections, have ballot boxes been lost. That election was voided and rerun from scratch. Paper works. You just need to see how other people are already using it successfully.
- wool_gather 8y ago
  If your vote can be associated back to you outside the polling station, vote coercion (and/or selling) becomes a concern.

by Isamu 8y ago

Shivetya 8y ago

well if anything it shows that you cannot trust paper ballots or that in a close contest no one will. electronic voting will work provided you can take a record of your vote, say a bar code, and scan it and verify your vote was recorded properly. so give them a paper copy with their votes printed out and a code they can scan either at home, their phone, any government facility, that says - yeah it counted. when it comes to bulk counting the electronic version is used or a printout of every single bar code value is mass scanned back in. how else can you have a paper ballot that cannot be altered?

tobylane 8y ago
What’s the it that shows you can’t trust paper? Votes being edited isn’t a fear here. We write with pencils in fear of disappearing ink but the whole counting process is monitored by the candidates, with no claims of vote editing.
jacques_chester 8y ago
> how else can you have a paper ballot that cannot be altered? With simple, boring techniques requiring the presence of multiple scrutineers appointed by different candidates. The process relies on mutual suspicion to detect problems at every step. In an Australian election, all ballot boxes are numbered. The seals are also numbered. When a ballot box is assembled, the seal numbers and box number are logged, signed by the senior Electoral Officer present and countersigned by at least two scrutineers appointed by different candidates. Ballots are not numbered, but are counted as they are dispensed. Each is initialled by the official who hands it to the voter. This process is observable by scrutineers. When time comes to count, the box numbers are cross-checked with the logs, again under scrutineers. When the ballots are hand-counted, it happens with scrutineers watching. When the tallies are made, it happens with scrutineers present. When any of the scrutineers disagrees with some aspect of the process, they can appeal to the electoral commission. If they're dissatisfied, the matter can be taken to the Court of Disputed Returns. So far as I am aware, only once, in over a century of Australian elections, have ballot boxes been lost. That election was voided and rerun from scratch. Paper works. You just need to see how other people are already using it successfully.
wool_gather 8y ago
If your vote can be associated back to you outside the polling station, vote coercion (and/or selling) becomes a concern.