3 ms·
Any news on encrypted SNI? ( eg https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-rescorla-tls-esni-00 https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-rescorla-tls-esni-00 [ https://datatrac
by pas 8y ago
Any news on encrypted SNI? ( eg https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-rescorla-tls-esni-00 https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-rescorla-tls-esni-00 [ https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-rescorla-tls-esni/history/ https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-rescorla-tls-esni/his... ] )
- hacknat 8y agoEncrypted SNI probably can’t make this version, as it requires a fair bit of new protocol infrastructure to support. The handshake would have to start with a generalized untrusted assymetric exchange exchange to transfer the SNI field then “upgrade” the connection to be trusted and then retroactively tell the client what the initial “untrusted” key was so that the client can confirm it didn’t suffer a man in the middle attack during the SNI transfer phase. All of this is possible and should be done, but I doubt it will make protocol 3.
- rocqua 8y agoAs far as I know, the SNI field is only used by the server to select what cert to use and site to serve. So if someone were to MitM the SNI exchange, presuming they don't have a valid cert, they could only cause the client to receive a different site (if served with a cert valid for both sites). We can presume the MitM doesn't have a valid cert, otherwise they could fully MitM the connection. To ensure your keys are indeed set up by the trusted party, you need to get that signed by the server cert, but that is already part of the TLS protocol. It seems I'm missing something.
- stanleydrew 8y agoThe danger is not that unencrypted SNI exposes clients to additional MitM attacks. It just exposes the client's intended domain to everyone on the connection route. It's an information leak, that's all.
- rocqua 8y agoI only skimmed the RFC, but it seems like the SNI can be send either in the extensions in the client hello, or later in the encrypted extensions.
- rocqua 8y agoNever mind, apparently encrypted extensions is only sent by the server to the client, not the other way around.
- nashvillecactus 8y agoI think you got it right the first time, server_name is referring to SNI in this context: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#page-37 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#page-37 Specifying which extensions are encrypted is part of the ClientHello. Encrypted Extensions are supposed to be sent directly after the client receives ServerHello. With that said, I don't think we'll see implementations of encrypted SNI in the wild any time soon. From the ietf draft on encrypted SNI: DISCLAIMER: This is very early a work-in-progress design and has not yet seen significant (or really any) security analysis. It should not be used as a basis for building production systems.
- rocqua 8y agoThat table is what I based my first post on. However, as far as I can find out, Encrypted Extensions are only ever send by the server to the client. [1] The SNI that most people care about encrypting are those sent from the user to the server. [1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#page-120 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446#page-120
- nashvillecactus 8y agoOkay, I see what you mean. Apparently I need to read more, because that completely flies in the face of how I thought this whole thing worked.
- rocqua 8y agoIt is sad to see the SNI encryption isn't in TLS 1.3. I'd say that unencrypted SNI is the single biggest issue with TLS 1.2; it is a very obvious leak of information. All of the improvements in TLS 1.3 are nice-to-haves, but they are mostly shoring up systems that are already pretty secure, whilst we leave the largest leak open.
- tialaramex 8y agoIn prior TLS versions the server certificate is sent unencrypted. So a passive eavesdropper gets not just the name but a certificate for that name from the server. This is fixed in TLS 1.3