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The threat model is corrupt election workers, who have unmonitored access to the machines. And if you find problems after the winner is declared? “Only the los
by michaelt 8y ago
The threat model is corrupt election workers, who have unmonitored access to the machines.
And if you find problems after the winner is declared? “Only the losing side cares, and they’re just sore losers”
Or an adversary could not commit fraud, just trip the fraud alarms in areas their opponent is strong.
So it’s very, very difficult to secure.
- TangoTrotFox 8y agoI think that's setting a very unreasonable standard as the exact same could be said of election workers in e.g. a paper balloting system. Votes get miscounted, votes go missing, a new box of 'votes' is added into the mix, etc. Electronic systems can provide a much better level of security than this through not only all the regular security techniques you'd apply to regular workers (no individual access, surveillance, etc) but also a wide array of electronic means including logging, 'ballot' validation, and much more. And you can also burn everything including the operating system and election software onto a non-flashable ROM meaning software modifications become all but impossible, and even if somehow achieved, would be trivial to detect.
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- blacksmith_tb 8y agoI am also not optimistic, but all of those are also failings of traditional voting methods. So one could offer the standard defense of self-driving cars, "it doesn't need to be perfect, as long as it's better" (but it may never be better...)
- benchaney 8y ago> but all of those are also failings of traditional voting methods This isn't true at all. There is not way to tamper with paper to make it change its properties that isn't obvious and easily detectable. And once votes are cast the ballots are handled with significantly more care.
- d0lph 8y agoCollusion of multiple parties meant to verify each other.
- beat 8y agoNot just collusion, but collusion at scale. See my description of the Minnesota process. Voting and counting are done at the precinct level, and there are thousands of precincts. It might be possible to subvert a single precinct, in order to manipulate its outcome. But how many precincts would need to be subverted in order to affect the outcome in a statistically meaningful way? Additionally, can the precinct be subverted in a manner that can withstand outside auditing by non-corrupt district/state-wide election officials? Keep in mind that if one party in the election has substantial reason to suspect the results were broadly rigged, they could demand a recount (even at their own cost, as happened with the Dayton/Emmer recount in MN), thus triggering all those downstream audit controls.
- jedberg 8y agoSomehow we manage to secure electronic banking despite possibly corrupt bank tellers having unmonitored access to the ATMs. I’m sure of the money were there we could secure voting the same way.
- DmenshunlAnlsis 8y agoElectronic banking is defrauded on a regular basis, including at the endpoint using jackpot schemes and more. It’s acceptable for banking given the amounts stolen are ultimately trivial, but not for voting.
- jedberg 8y agoWhy isn’t that acceptable? Those things get detected and fixed and that’s all that really matters in voting.
- benchaney 8y agoSometimes they get detected and fixed, and sometimes they just get written off because they are small amounts. Besides an important part of banks fixing issues like this (when they do fix them) is that someone (often the bank itself) must lose money, which they inevitably notice. In the case of an election, no one would ever know if their vote was stolen because they have no way of tracking it once they cast it. You seem to be blindly assuming that every problem will get detected and fixed which is mindbogglingly niave.
- michaelt 8y agoWhat happens when there are election irregularities detected after a winner has been declared? 2000 presidential election. Bush declared victor, but a Florida state law called for a recount as the margin was close. Recount was stopped, original election result stands. [1] 2016 brexit referendum. Leave campaign wins - and is later found to have broken campaign finance laws [2]. Original election result stands. 2016 presidential election. Trump declared victor, but evidence emerges of Russian interference [3]. Original election result stands. There's no point in detecting irregularities after an election is over if they aren't going to be fixed - and history shows they won't be fixed. I'll stick with pencil-and-paper ballots thanks very much. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2000_United_States_presidential_election_recount_in_Florida https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2000_United_States_presidentia... [2] https://www.standard.co.uk/news/politics/brexit-news-latest-leaveeu-fined-70000-after-electoral-commission-investigation-into-eu-referendum-a3836216.html https://www.standard.co.uk/news/politics/brexit-news-latest-... [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_interference_in_the_2016_United_States_elections https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_interference_in_the_20...
- gregmac 8y agoAnother threat model is the people who build the software and hardware. How do you ensure: (1) The software is not doing anything nefarious (2) The software toolchain is not modifying the software in (1) to cause it to do something nefarious (3) The software loaded onto the machines is actually the software verified in (1) and compiled by the verified toolchain in (2) (4) The machine doesn't have any kind of hardware/firmware-based defeat device to trick you into falsely confirming (3) This is essentially the same problem as is outlined in Ken Thompson's Reflections on Trusting Trust [1]. [1] https://www.archive.ece.cmu.edu/~ganger/712.fall02/papers/p761-thompson.pdf https://www.archive.ece.cmu.edu/~ganger/712.fall02/papers/p7...
- d0lph 8y ago> (1) The software is not doing anything nefarious Open source > (2) The software toolchain is not modifying the software in (1) to cause it to do something nefarious Use open source toolchains and hash the result. > (3) The software loaded onto the machines is actually the software verified in (1) and compiled by the verified toolchain in (2) Maybe some kind of cryptographic puzzle, question/response, you need to make a hash with the program, and make the HDD not large enough to contain more than that. Or maybe read only storage. Even a combination. > (4) The machine doesn't have any kind of hardware/firmware-based defeat device to trick you into falsely confirming (3) Your voting results are confirmable on the blockchain, but not specific, you can check that your vote hasn't been changed, but not the vote itself.
- beat 8y agoThe blockchain voting idea, among its numerous flaws, is philosophically grounded in hyperindividualism. I care about the integrity of my ballot, and mine alone. But elections are not about my vote. They're about everyone's vote. I care about not just the integrity of my own ballot, but the integrity of every other voter's ballot as well. And, given a system where most people will never do a complex blockchain verification of their ballot, or have a mechanism to be certain that no additional machine-generated ballots were added to the results... blockchain isn't solving the actual problem. Don't be in love with technology when looking for actual solutions to actual problems.
- jaredklewis 8y agoAren’t many of these problems amenable to solutions with asymetric cryptography? I.e people signing their votes with a key and the vote only be decryptable by a multi-part key, with the various parts being disrrinuted between the major parties and media. Of course this has its own set of tradeoffs, but so does our current system.
- beat 8y agoFirst, why? What problem does this actually solve, other than the technical daring-do of it all? This can all be done easily with paper (see my post about Minnesota's process). Second, it violates the principle of a secret ballot. Repudiation would require voters to reveal who they voted for, to match ballot to (digital) signature. So it's not viable as a mechanism for a global recount.
- d0lph 8y agoThe ideal e-voting program/platform would increase security and verifiability. Right now I don't know if my vote has been tampered with. The secret ballot could be reproduced a number of ways, but I'm particularly fond of the idea you have an extra password that makes it look like your vote was different, and only your password shows you who you really voted for.
- beat 8y agoThe solution to every security problem is more complexity. And, in a well designed paper voting system, you do know your vote was not tampered with, because nobody's votes were tampered with. There are only three mechanisms for tampering with the actual vote count - adding ballots, removing ballots, or altering the content of ballots. (Replacing ballots is a combined add/remove.) The blockchain mechanism only checks for alteration/removal, and only for a single vote. One individual can verify their own ballot, but repudiation requires breaking secrecy. It's simply not a very good solution. And the reason it's not a good solution is philosophical - it's focused on the individual, when the election is about the collective. Any effective election validation system must validate the collective, not just the individual. The collective is validated by insuring that no tampering happened anywhere. And if we can demonstrate that, then verification/repudiation of individual ballots is irrelevant. If A is true for all B, and C is a B, then A is true for C. But when you really love your hammer, every problem looks like a nail. Blockchain is basically useless for elections, but people obsess over it anyway.