5 ms·
Even if a hypothetical voting machine was open source, and developed by an independent 3rd party, it's still not enough IMO. How many people in the country can
by Klathmon 8y ago
Even if a hypothetical voting machine was open source, and developed by an independent 3rd party, it's still not enough IMO.
How many people in the country can correctly audit complicated cryptographic protocols? How many can fully audit a codebase like this? And how many of those do you think would instantly shut up if threatened with a lifetime of jail or death?
Have you ever seen the underhanded C contest? It's nearly impossible for seasoned developers to find the problems with some of those, in a contest where they KNOW for a fact that there is an exploit, and even sometimes what that exploit is trying to achieve.
I can make a complete guess at the number of people capable of auditing this in the US being less than 1000, and the number of people in that position willing to sacrifice everything to tell the world about their discoveries being basically zero.
But let's even ignore that, let's say that there are tens of thousands of capable engineers chomping at the bit to review this. How do you prove that code is what is running on your voting machine? How do you know the hardware is secure? If you come up with steps to fullproof verify, how many people will check it? How many people will be capable of checking their cryptographic proof (if the scheme has one).
This is voting, 1-2% can make all the difference, and if a bad actor can modify 1-2% in some key areas, they can swing the whole election.
Stick with paper checkmarks thrown into a ballot box, written on with pencils. Then every single person that is able to count can help "verify", they can guard that box all election day if they want, 1 or 100's of people can all do it, old, young, english speaking or otherwise.
We have a nearly perfect system right now, but nobody wants to use it, and I can't for the life of me see why.
- ebiester 8y agoI agree with you, and think a paper trail is vital. However, we currently have machines that count those checkboxes/scantrons, and I'd like to put that same standard to those counting machines.
- Klathmon 8y agoAnd I think we should get rid of those counting machines as well. Humans are perfectly capable of counting, and they don't mistake a half-filled bubble for "no vote", and aren't susceptible to changing 1% of votes at random or at the final tally. And it's not nearly as possible to trick or force hundreds or thousands of humans to help rig an election, compared to a handful of people at the final assembly line of that counting machine factory.
- ebiester 8y agoYou don't think humans can't or won't misread votes, especially as a mistake? You have to have two people (one D, one R) both looking at each one at that point.
- Klathmon 8y agoI think a human can and will misread votes, but 2 humans? 5 humans? 20 humans? The more contentious the voting is, the more people can gather around and count along. And there isn't really a limit to how many can be a part of it, if it grows to be too large, additional work can be done to accommodate the extra people. Counting will take longer, but it will be that much more secure. Hell, go ahead and throw a counting machine on there as well, but don't rely on it, and don't have it be the single source of truth, or only use humans in case of a "recount" or something.
- ebiester 8y agoI'd work with a sampling procedure before the certification combined with using humans if below a certain threshold.