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There are nation-state attackers and nation-state attackers. Most oppressive regimes don't have the technological resources to perform complex attacks on relati

There are nation-state attackers and nation-state attackers. Most oppressive regimes don't have the technological resources to perform complex attacks on relatively tough systems, but they can perform pervasive monitoring on layer 1, use dodgy certificates to undermine TLS and bribe or coerce corporate actors. Most people in functioning democracies aren't particularly worried about becoming the target of the full might of a three-letter agency, but they might be worried about bulk collection via L1 or PRISM intercepts. Signal is a vast improvement over SMS, plaintext email or any commercial messaging application, but it's no more difficult to use. It's relatively foolproof, in that user error can't fatally undermine the security model in most cases. It's not perfect, but it's easily the most secure chat app that I could confidently persuade non-techies to actually use. A highly secure app that you don't know how to use offers you no security at all.

lmm 8y ago
> they can perform pervasive monitoring on layer 1 Indeed (particularly as telecoms are often state-owned in those regimes), which is what makes phone-number-as-ID such a bad idea. > use dodgy certificates to undermine TLS Difficult in these days of certificate transparency and HPKP. > bribe or coerce corporate actors If that's your worry surely you want to rely on a big corporation rather than Signal. Look at e.g. Brazil having to block WhatsApp entirely because Facebook wouldn't play ball with them. Facebook has deep pockets that mean they can afford to do that kind of thing. > Signal is a vast improvement over SMS, plaintext email Agreed > or any commercial messaging application, Not convinced that there's a significant improvement here. Plenty of commercial messaging applications have encryption. If the server is under an attacker's control then you're vulnerable, but I'm not convinced that isn't the case with Signal too.

lmm 8y ago

> they can perform pervasive monitoring on layer 1 Indeed (particularly as telecoms are often state-owned in those regimes), which is what makes phone-number-as-ID such a bad idea. > use dodgy certificates to undermine TLS Difficult in these days of certificate transparency and HPKP. > bribe or coerce corporate actors If that's your worry surely you want to rely on a big corporation rather than Signal. Look at e.g. Brazil having to block WhatsApp entirely because Facebook wouldn't play ball with them. Facebook has deep pockets that mean they can afford to do that kind of thing. > Signal is a vast improvement over SMS, plaintext email Agreed > or any commercial messaging application, Not convinced that there's a significant improvement here. Plenty of commercial messaging applications have encryption. If the server is under an attacker's control then you're vulnerable, but I'm not convinced that isn't the case with Signal too.