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Is it even possible for the Signal servers to keep track of who you talk to, when, and how often? I was under the impression that those two data points they sto
by Vinnl 8y ago
Is it even possible for the Signal servers to keep track of who you talk to, when, and how often? I was under the impression that those two data points they stored were the only thing they _could_ store, because the rest is sent to the servers encrypted.
Edit: Yes, apparently they have a method of doing private contact discovery and, IIUC, even a method for the client to verify that the server is running the source code they expect: https://signal.org/blog/private-contact-discovery/#trust-but-verify https://signal.org/blog/private-contact-discovery/#trust-but...
- subway 8y agoSignal has to be able to route messages from user a to user b through their centralized server, so at a minimum they are capable of logging "This user sent a message that we relayed to this other user".
- cuckcuckspruce 8y agoFurther, they don't have to look at the message to also log the time the message was received. That's why I've always appreciated the concept of Mixmaster's ability to delay sending messages by a fixed number of hours or a random amount in a range as an attempt to stymie traffic analysis.
- lmm 8y agoThe signal server is responsible for doing the trust-on-first-use key exchange and letting you send offline messages to your counterparties. If your client could somehow be tricked into thinking that the other side was offline and you'd already sent them a large number of messages while they were offline, or that this was the first time you were talking to them, your client would leak a lot of metadata to the server. And given that the server is in charge of routing your messages to your counterparties, it seems like there's a lot of potential for a hostile server to trick the client in that way. Theoretically it might be possible for a sufficiently paranoid client to cover all the bases. But it's certainly a huge attack surface.