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Signal is not for state-proof encrypted communication. Not large states like the USA or Russia. If you think it is, you've been misinformed. For state actor pro

Signal is not for state-proof encrypted communication. Not large states like the USA or Russia. If you think it is, you've been misinformed. For state actor proof communications you need to evaluate every action you take and think: "What are the assumptions that I'm making here?" One assumption is that you're not currently on anyone's radar. Are you willing to bet the entire enterprise on this assumption? How certain are you? Are you 99.999% certain? Another assumption is that the operating system you are running the app in is not compromised on either end of the communication. 99.99%? Another assumption is that the screen isn't viewable by other devices. Another assumption is that the frequency of your key taps aren't picked up by a mic and then turned into intelligible letters. Another assumption is that the encryption algorithms you're utilizing haven't been subtly chosen to be intelligible to a single actor or that they'll stay secure once we have quantum computers. Etc. Etc. Etc. Signal is good because it raises the bar. Stock traders buying black information probably won't get your communications. They won't be scooped up in a email server leak. They wont be visible to your wife when she enters your phone's unlock code because they auto delete, and they don't get pushed to your iPad, like FB messenger[0]. But if you want to go up against James Bond, and you're already on his radar, you need to give up the illusion that anything computer related is fully trustable. Just pre-arrange some code words or OTPs and meet in person in an area without electronics or go even more old school and use dead drops with hand written communication. [0] I personally know 3 people that were caught cheating this way.

lmm 8y ago
> Signal is not for state-proof encrypted communication. Not large states like the USA or Russia. If you think it is, you've been misinformed. Ok, but in that case what does Signal offer that any random messenger with transport encryption doesn't? If your threat model doesn't include state actors then you can probably trust a) the HTTPS certificate infrastructure b) an international corporation like Facebook, so you can probably assume that no-one would tap your FB messenger messages in transit. "Not pushed to your iPad" sounds more like a bug than a feature - I want to be able to read my messages anywhere that I'm logged in as me (at least while I have my yubikey or what have you plugged into that device). Automatic deletion... eh, I would rather make a deliberate decision about when to delete things, personally.
- 3pt14159 8y ago
  1. The HTTPS infrastructure is downgradeable and relies on DNS and a multitude of certificates. And not all the ciphers are safe. Yes it can be done securely-ish, but unless you're layering another level of encryption over HTTPS it isn't fully secure. Layering is what the CIA does, according to the Snowden leaks. 2. As for the rest of it: Cool man, that sounds like you want a normal chat app that is more usable and less secure. I use Messenger too for things that don't matter.
  - lmm 8y ago
    > The HTTPS infrastructure is downgradeable and relies on DNS and a multitude of certificates. And not all the ciphers are safe. Yes it can be done securely-ish There's no reliance on DNS. We know what the right way to do HTTPS is, and an app that doesn't have to maintain compatibility with ancient browsers can use a strictly secure profile (no old ciphers, no downgrades etc.). HTTPS is older and more complex than the Signal protocol, but it's also extremely widely deployed and gets a huge amount of attention from security researchers. I think actual attacks on the protocol are less likely with HTTPS than with Signal. > unless you're layering another level of encryption over HTTPS it isn't fully secure. Nonsense. Two layers of valid encryption are no more secure than one, and two layers of flawed encryption will almost certainly still be flawed. > 2. As for the rest of it: Cool man, that sounds like you want a normal chat app that is more usable and less secure. I use Messenger too for things that don't matter. It's not that my chats don't matter. It's that I don't think autodeletion or one-device-only represent a meaningful security improvement.
    - 3pt14159 8y ago
      > There's no reliance on DNS. In practice there is for most situations. Are you going to get a static IP and go through the work of finding one of the rare cert authorities to get an HTTPS cert for it authorized? > Nonsense. Two layers of valid encryption are no more secure than one, and two layers of flawed encryption will almost certainly still be flawed. I hate arguing about this because I feel like there is a difference between how mathematicians think and how engineers thinks. I agree that one of the layers should be HTTPS if the context allows for it, because it has a lot of eyes on it, as you mention; but I fail to see how layering encryption is bad from a privacy standpoint. Mathematically, this statement: > Two layers of valid encryption are no more secure than one. Is only true if there are no mistakes and if it would take more operations in the universe to break the first layer of encryption. But why should we, a priori, assume that there are no mistakes? We have hundreds of examples of thought-to-be-secure ciphers / one way hashes ending up in the trash heap. Look at things like Cloudbleed. In reality things break. In reality cert authorities get moled or hacked. If you've been using layered encryption you're safer. Also, HTTPS basically mandates that you use TLS, which for some contexts doesn't work because we'd prefer a one-way (i.e., connectionless) channel to communicate to stop inbound traffic at the physical layer. > It's that I don't think autodeletion or one-device-only represent a meaningful security improvement. It's helped plenty of people that have had their phone seized at the border or their other device seized by the police. Sometimes you don't that information is sensitive until later, and sometimes you choosing to delete it at that point is illegal or impossible.
drb91 8y ago
Well if you’re ignoring state actor security and trusting a provider, what does signal offer over irc/tls?

lmm 8y ago

> Signal is not for state-proof encrypted communication. Not large states like the USA or Russia. If you think it is, you've been misinformed. Ok, but in that case what does Signal offer that any random messenger with transport encryption doesn't? If your threat model doesn't include state actors then you can probably trust a) the HTTPS certificate infrastructure b) an international corporation like Facebook, so you can probably assume that no-one would tap your FB messenger messages in transit. "Not pushed to your iPad" sounds more like a bug than a feature - I want to be able to read my messages anywhere that I'm logged in as me (at least while I have my yubikey or what have you plugged into that device). Automatic deletion... eh, I would rather make a deliberate decision about when to delete things, personally.

3pt14159 8y ago
1. The HTTPS infrastructure is downgradeable and relies on DNS and a multitude of certificates. And not all the ciphers are safe. Yes it can be done securely-ish, but unless you're layering another level of encryption over HTTPS it isn't fully secure. Layering is what the CIA does, according to the Snowden leaks. 2. As for the rest of it: Cool man, that sounds like you want a normal chat app that is more usable and less secure. I use Messenger too for things that don't matter.
- lmm 8y ago
  > The HTTPS infrastructure is downgradeable and relies on DNS and a multitude of certificates. And not all the ciphers are safe. Yes it can be done securely-ish There's no reliance on DNS. We know what the right way to do HTTPS is, and an app that doesn't have to maintain compatibility with ancient browsers can use a strictly secure profile (no old ciphers, no downgrades etc.). HTTPS is older and more complex than the Signal protocol, but it's also extremely widely deployed and gets a huge amount of attention from security researchers. I think actual attacks on the protocol are less likely with HTTPS than with Signal. > unless you're layering another level of encryption over HTTPS it isn't fully secure. Nonsense. Two layers of valid encryption are no more secure than one, and two layers of flawed encryption will almost certainly still be flawed. > 2. As for the rest of it: Cool man, that sounds like you want a normal chat app that is more usable and less secure. I use Messenger too for things that don't matter. It's not that my chats don't matter. It's that I don't think autodeletion or one-device-only represent a meaningful security improvement.
  - 3pt14159 8y ago
    > There's no reliance on DNS. In practice there is for most situations. Are you going to get a static IP and go through the work of finding one of the rare cert authorities to get an HTTPS cert for it authorized? > Nonsense. Two layers of valid encryption are no more secure than one, and two layers of flawed encryption will almost certainly still be flawed. I hate arguing about this because I feel like there is a difference between how mathematicians think and how engineers thinks. I agree that one of the layers should be HTTPS if the context allows for it, because it has a lot of eyes on it, as you mention; but I fail to see how layering encryption is bad from a privacy standpoint. Mathematically, this statement: > Two layers of valid encryption are no more secure than one. Is only true if there are no mistakes and if it would take more operations in the universe to break the first layer of encryption. But why should we, a priori, assume that there are no mistakes? We have hundreds of examples of thought-to-be-secure ciphers / one way hashes ending up in the trash heap. Look at things like Cloudbleed. In reality things break. In reality cert authorities get moled or hacked. If you've been using layered encryption you're safer. Also, HTTPS basically mandates that you use TLS, which for some contexts doesn't work because we'd prefer a one-way (i.e., connectionless) channel to communicate to stop inbound traffic at the physical layer. > It's that I don't think autodeletion or one-device-only represent a meaningful security improvement. It's helped plenty of people that have had their phone seized at the border or their other device seized by the police. Sometimes you don't that information is sensitive until later, and sometimes you choosing to delete it at that point is illegal or impossible.

drb91 8y ago

Well if you’re ignoring state actor security and trusting a provider, what does signal offer over irc/tls?