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But we have to trust that Moxie is running the server software he says he is. We have to trust that he isn’t writing down a list of people we’ve talked to, when
by hprotagonist 8y ago
But we have to trust that Moxie is running the server software he says he is. We have to trust that he isn’t writing down a list of people we’ve talked to, when, and how often. We have to trust not only that Moxie is trustworthy, but given that Open Whisper Systems is based in San Francisco we have to trust that he hasn’t received a national security letter, too (by the way, Signal doesn’t have a warrant canary). Moxie can tell us he doesn’t store these things, but he could. Truly secure systems don’t require trust.
We have at least one data point that says that Signal stores exactly two integers about you, or did when the subpoena was issued: https://www.aclu.org/open-whisper-systems-subpoena-documents https://www.aclu.org/open-whisper-systems-subpoena-documents
things can always change, but that’s evidence submitted in court under the penalty of perjury, which is a fairly strong claim.
- lmm 8y agoIf Open Whisper Systems had received a national security letter requiring them to collect more information and keep it secret that they were doing so, how would you expect them to have responded to that subpoena?
- dannyw 8y agoNSLs don’t allow that.
- hprotagonist 8y agoprecisely the way they did, which was to challenge the gag order, and win. That’s where the documents above come from, in fact.
- zmanian 8y agoNSL can't require to collect new business records. They can only compel you to disclose business records that you already have. This is beyond the legal authority of an NSL.
- lawnchair_larry 8y agoI’m pretty sure that isn’t true. They can be used to compel you to build interception capabilities.
- gruez 8y agosource?
- eli 8y agoIt's complicated, but that's kinda what happened to the Lavabit "secure" webmail service. When the owner wouldn't install a backdoor, the FBI sought the private encryption keys so they could MITM the whole site. https://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/how-lavabit-melted-down https://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/how-lavabit-melted-d...
- angry_octet 8y agoThat isn't building an interception mechanism, it's revealing some private information Lavabit held.
- Nasrudith 8y agoThe big Apple vs FBI high profile lawsuit for one. Granted that was a telegraphed precedent seeking exercise by "accidentally" losing access to the work phone after the terrorists destroyed their personal phones before the attack.
- tptacek 8y agoThis is a good question, because it illuminates design decisions that Signal has made that confuse nerds. For instance: Signal only recently got user profiles --- user profiles! --- because they took their time figuring out how to deliver them without sacrificing privacy. Take some time to look at how they implemented Giphy sharing to get an idea of what I'm talking about. Any information the Signal client reveals to the server is, indeed, something the USG could make a legal claim on. Probably even if Signal's server code doesn't now even collect it. The Signal team has been sounding that alarm for years: when you look at a chat program with fancy whiz-bang features, consider what those features expose (traffic-analytically, even). "Maybe have fewer features until we figure this out", Signal says. The market does not agree, and that has been rough for Signal, and they deserve credit for the stand they are taking on it.
- Cowen 8y ago> We have at least one data point that says that Signal stores exactly two integers about you For people wondering what they are: > "The only information responsive to the subpoena held by OWS is the time of account creation and the date of the last connection to Signal servers for account [redacted]. Consistent with the Electronic Conununications Privacy Act ("ECPA"), 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2), OWS is providing this information in response to the subpoena." Their response to the subpoena then goes on to object to its overly broad scope, which asked for things that require a court order or a search warrant. They also object to the scope of the nondisclosure order included in the subpoena.
- alexnewman 8y agoUhm... this is what would happen if it was a govt job
- guiraldelli 8y agoI am happy to see I am not the only person in the world that feels like this about Signal. The interesting fact is that I "Ctrl+F" this page for Wire and I have seen nothing, even though this comment is about something that made me switch over Wire from Signal: to date, that's the unique instant messaging that has FOSS'ed both the server and the clients. (OK, the article also says about Matrix.) I admire Wire for a number of reasons, but certainly FOSS'ing all their code is one the main reasons. (The other is... Haskell! And also Rust.) And just to point out, not only Wire bug-fixed the library implementation of the Signal protocol, as they use the Signal protocol. And their web interface is very good! Oh, yes... And they are not based in USA. EDIT: I am not affiliated with Wire, but just a happy customer. :)
- mathnmusic 8y agoSignal, in an indirect way, requires 1/6th of the world's population to part with their biometrics. It requires phone number, and in India, getting a phone # requires Aadhaar, which is a centralized, biometrics-based ID (photo, fingerprints AND iris at the moment).
- j16sdiz 8y agoI see this as a good thing because it effectively rate limit the spam bot creations
- alexnewman 8y agoYa really think phone numbers are hard to get?
- FrozenTraffic 8y agoSince there is someone above claiming that getting a phone number in some countries "requires" biometric identification, I'd say yes.
- 8y ago
- Vinnl 8y agoIs it even possible for the Signal servers to keep track of who you talk to, when, and how often? I was under the impression that those two data points they stored were the only thing they _could_ store, because the rest is sent to the servers encrypted. Edit: Yes, apparently they have a method of doing private contact discovery and, IIUC, even a method for the client to verify that the server is running the source code they expect: https://signal.org/blog/private-contact-discovery/#trust-but-verify https://signal.org/blog/private-contact-discovery/#trust-but...
- subway 8y agoSignal has to be able to route messages from user a to user b through their centralized server, so at a minimum they are capable of logging "This user sent a message that we relayed to this other user".
- cuckcuckspruce 8y agoFurther, they don't have to look at the message to also log the time the message was received. That's why I've always appreciated the concept of Mixmaster's ability to delay sending messages by a fixed number of hours or a random amount in a range as an attempt to stymie traffic analysis.
- lmm 8y agoThe signal server is responsible for doing the trust-on-first-use key exchange and letting you send offline messages to your counterparties. If your client could somehow be tricked into thinking that the other side was offline and you'd already sent them a large number of messages while they were offline, or that this was the first time you were talking to them, your client would leak a lot of metadata to the server. And given that the server is in charge of routing your messages to your counterparties, it seems like there's a lot of potential for a hostile server to trick the client in that way. Theoretically it might be possible for a sufficiently paranoid client to cover all the bases. But it's certainly a huge attack surface.
- thsealienbstrds 8y agoIf I read that document correctly, it's more accurate to say that Signal stores at least two integers, rather than exactly. Signal did not provide information that does not fall under certain information categories, and they say that a court order would be needed to force them to disclose any of that information (if they possess any, which they deny).