5 ms·

"If Edward Snowden and Bruce Schneier are going to spout the virtues of the app, I expect it to actually be secure when it matters - when vulnerable people usin

"If Edward Snowden and Bruce Schneier are going to spout the virtues of the app, I expect it to actually be secure when it matters - when vulnerable people using it to encrypt sensitive communications are targeted by smart and powerful adversaries." Because if the adversary is, say, an abusive ex that happens to work for the telco, for example, then it doesn't matter. Unless you're actively hunted by a G7 country your problems are inconsequential.

threatofrain 8y ago
How do you defend abused spouses in discourse by comparing their needs to people hunted by the most powerful political forces? Surely these two cases ought not be on the same table for comparison.
- JasonFruit 8y ago
  I think the top-level comment is unfair, but I also think you're misreading it. It's not defending abusive exes, but saying they are, though a lesser threat than major governments, still a threat worth defending against.
- LaGrange 8y ago
  The original autor outright dismissed the entire class of threats, which, while they may seem "lesser," are also far more common. And it's not just abusive exes, not even every state actor has access to an NSA. Neither Signal nor any other existing application based by the same protocol (which exist and are _more_ popular than Signal itself — What's App is one, for example) are sufficient, but on the other hand, it requires far less knowledge to operate. Signal comes from recognition that very few people can practically operate high-effort tools, and if the effort to operate a fancy tool distracts them too much from the things they actually aim to do (it's rare that someone's goal in life is "using Matrix"), they'll fall back on something that doesn't distract them. For example, even when facing a state actor — if training your cadres to securely operate an encryption tool takes away too much from the core activism of your organization, the tool is no longer helpful. Same applies if the actual overhead of using it ("both have to be online" requirements, for example, or for somewhat lower threat profiles, "no emoji") makes it impractical. For most people the threat is going to be someone they know, or high-volume-low-effort attempts. Whether it's an ex or a boss or even most states, it's unlikely they're facing NSA. They often have a lot of other things to do, and neither their ability nor want to enforce technical solutions on others are high. That's the range Signal-backed apps generally target.
  - nickpsecurity 8y ago
    I always give people the "Who Uses Tor?" page when they wonder about various threats we're addressing with privacy technology. It has a lot of examples that laypeople will understand. It also counters the "only used by criminals" myth that some believe. It also has examples of law enforcement depending on these technologies. That counters the follow-up claim that encryption or privacy tech is just a negative for law enforcement. So, I suggest just giving people the link telling them they'll see many of the benefits. It's worked so far for me. https://www.torproject.org/about/torusers.html.en https://www.torproject.org/about/torusers.html.en
  - Bartweiss 8y ago
    > not even every state actor has access to an NSA This is a massively undervalued point. As far as I can tell, most of the people relying on Signal/WhatsApp/Firechat/etc for life-or-death issues are neither hiding from exes nor fleeing the US government. The bulk of use seems to be journalists and protestors in places like Turkey or Bangladesh who have reason to fear state monitoring of communications, but are unlikely to face deep or targeted attacks like having been served a compromised APK from day one. That Turkey example is seriously relevant. In 2013, the Turkish government created a fraudulent certificate allowing it to intercept traffic to all Google domains, potentially viewing things like gchat and gmail communications. This offered a whole bunch of lessons: - That the CA web-of-trust model is seriously broken, as we've seen repeatedly. - That even if companies secure their data and respect your privacy, non-E2E data transfer can still be unsafe. - That any software or data obtained under a hostile network without a prior signed session is unsafe. Play Store Signal installs in that time could theoretically have been compromised, but "app store versus dedicated download site" and "checksum vs. signature" were irrelevant; all four paths could have been compromised via the same attack vector. - That "secure download environment, insecure usage environment" is a major, meaningful category of use. That describes a journalist installing Signal in the US and flying to Turkey; an activist installing it prior to a regime change; or a protestor copying it from a trusted friend's installation. So you're exactly right: Signal isn't a complete solution for an adversary with unlimited resources and direct access to every layer of a network, but it's still massively important even for dealing with most state actors.

threatofrain 8y ago

How do you defend abused spouses in discourse by comparing their needs to people hunted by the most powerful political forces? Surely these two cases ought not be on the same table for comparison.

JasonFruit 8y ago
I think the top-level comment is unfair, but I also think you're misreading it. It's not defending abusive exes, but saying they are, though a lesser threat than major governments, still a threat worth defending against.
LaGrange 8y ago
The original autor outright dismissed the entire class of threats, which, while they may seem "lesser," are also far more common. And it's not just abusive exes, not even every state actor has access to an NSA. Neither Signal nor any other existing application based by the same protocol (which exist and are _more_ popular than Signal itself — What's App is one, for example) are sufficient, but on the other hand, it requires far less knowledge to operate. Signal comes from recognition that very few people can practically operate high-effort tools, and if the effort to operate a fancy tool distracts them too much from the things they actually aim to do (it's rare that someone's goal in life is "using Matrix"), they'll fall back on something that doesn't distract them. For example, even when facing a state actor — if training your cadres to securely operate an encryption tool takes away too much from the core activism of your organization, the tool is no longer helpful. Same applies if the actual overhead of using it ("both have to be online" requirements, for example, or for somewhat lower threat profiles, "no emoji") makes it impractical. For most people the threat is going to be someone they know, or high-volume-low-effort attempts. Whether it's an ex or a boss or even most states, it's unlikely they're facing NSA. They often have a lot of other things to do, and neither their ability nor want to enforce technical solutions on others are high. That's the range Signal-backed apps generally target.
- nickpsecurity 8y ago
  I always give people the "Who Uses Tor?" page when they wonder about various threats we're addressing with privacy technology. It has a lot of examples that laypeople will understand. It also counters the "only used by criminals" myth that some believe. It also has examples of law enforcement depending on these technologies. That counters the follow-up claim that encryption or privacy tech is just a negative for law enforcement. So, I suggest just giving people the link telling them they'll see many of the benefits. It's worked so far for me. https://www.torproject.org/about/torusers.html.en https://www.torproject.org/about/torusers.html.en
- Bartweiss 8y ago
  > not even every state actor has access to an NSA This is a massively undervalued point. As far as I can tell, most of the people relying on Signal/WhatsApp/Firechat/etc for life-or-death issues are neither hiding from exes nor fleeing the US government. The bulk of use seems to be journalists and protestors in places like Turkey or Bangladesh who have reason to fear state monitoring of communications, but are unlikely to face deep or targeted attacks like having been served a compromised APK from day one. That Turkey example is seriously relevant. In 2013, the Turkish government created a fraudulent certificate allowing it to intercept traffic to all Google domains, potentially viewing things like gchat and gmail communications. This offered a whole bunch of lessons: - That the CA web-of-trust model is seriously broken, as we've seen repeatedly. - That even if companies secure their data and respect your privacy, non-E2E data transfer can still be unsafe. - That any software or data obtained under a hostile network without a prior signed session is unsafe. Play Store Signal installs in that time could theoretically have been compromised, but "app store versus dedicated download site" and "checksum vs. signature" were irrelevant; all four paths could have been compromised via the same attack vector. - That "secure download environment, insecure usage environment" is a major, meaningful category of use. That describes a journalist installing Signal in the US and flying to Turkey; an activist installing it prior to a regime change; or a protestor copying it from a trusted friend's installation. So you're exactly right: Signal isn't a complete solution for an adversary with unlimited resources and direct access to every layer of a network, but it's still massively important even for dealing with most state actors.