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Military bases are frequently in populated areas; it would be wildly impractical to harass everyone who drives by the perimeter. Half the SCIF spec (which is pu
by closeparen 8y ago
Military bases are frequently in populated areas; it would be wildly impractical to harass everyone who drives by the perimeter. Half the SCIF spec (which is public!) is about containing sensitive emissions inside the SCIF. And if you did have concerns about the airwaves around the base, why wouldn’t you just draw a bigger perimeter, rather than risk having sensitive areas outside the fence?
- mcguire 8y agoThis. I work on Redstone Arsenal. I don't work with anything especially secured, but I've met people who do. They work inside a SCIF; no network, no personal electronics in the SCIF, but there's no particular requirements outside.
- mobilemidget 8y agoThis too :-) not special about you. But people worry about information leaks by watches and fitbits, yet half the commenters here easily share where or what they have worked on in a public accessible site
- derefr 8y agoSure. I was more thinking about the bases in non-populated areas, esp. when the base is large enough that you can’t actually guard or fence the entire perimeter (like an Air Force base where the hypothetical SCIF would encompass thousands of square miles of airspace.) People can just drive down a random stretch of desert road near Groom Lake and start catching signals from passing test craft. At some scale you’ve got to give up on the concept of an SCIF and just deal with the fact that people are going to be catching some of what you’re putting out, doing whatever you can to mitigate the damage from there. (Which—if you can at least know where such people are from a satellite view and get guards to them within 10mins of the perimeter breach when they’re still either making their way deeper in, or are driving back out through a bunch of nothing—translates to “you can catch up to them and wreck their equipment.”) Like I said, I’m not sure how this strategy adapts to the existence of satellite phones. I don’t think it does. So far, instead, satellite phones have adapted themselves to it: you can’t get an Iridium phone without a security screening. I’m not sure what will happen if “private cubesat satphone networks” become a cheap commodity thing to insert into orbit—I think the US and other governments are simply trying to stall that process as long as possible. (Look at the history of satphone networks that competed with Iridium to see what I mean.)
- closeparen 8y agoReporters, fisherman, and all sorts of mundane professional applications can get satphones. I’m sure the kind of foreign power that’s interested in our aerospace R&D can as well.
- derefr 8y agoYes, they can—but they still need a security screening to do so. The point of the security screening is precisely to figure out whether you're "just" a reporter/fisherman/etc., or you're actually a spy or catspaw for a foreign power. Though, to be clear, "security screening" is a bit of a misnomer here. It isn't a one-time thing. The point of giving someone a security screening isn't really the pre-screening that occurs when you first sign up; it's the continuous monitoring you are implicitly signing up for. My understanding, from conversations over beers with a few friends retired from the US Navy and NSA: Signing up for a satphone (or a NEXUS card, or a private pilot's license, or any of a number of other things—including, obviously, secret clearance or access to a security compartment) marks you as a Person Of Interest in PRISM and other monitoring systems. In response, the monitoring systems begin actually caching the event data they see about you into an online data warehouse, rather than just feeding it all into a data lake. The data warehouse is queried out, for each new PoI, to build an individualized ML model (Palantir Intelligence, I think is the software?), where the data initially gathered during your pre-screen is used as the training data—in est, a behavioural baseline. Once the individualized ML model for you is established, it will be run as a batch process (along with thousands of other ML models), about once per day, against any/all newly-arrived PoI event data in the data warehouse. The ML model spits out prediction error; and the system flags anyone with consistently high prediction error as being in need of re-investigation. In other words, by signing up for a satphone, you're asking the government to keep a detail on you to see if you do anything out-of-character. Just, y'know, a detail that's 99% automated.