SpiderOak basically said "if we do this, you should stop using us" (well, if you care about warrant canaries). And then they did it. It doesn't mean that they

SpiderOak basically said "if we do this, you should stop using us" (well, if you care about warrant canaries). And then they did it. It doesn't mean that they received a warrant, but it does mean SpiderOak is telling you not to use them, and I think that when a service tell you that, for whatever reason, it means quite a lot. :) (Even if, as you suggest further down, they received legal advice that warrant canaries were a bad idea and they needed to take it down, the way they handled the entire process makes it clear that they aren't taking this seriously. Posting a warrant canary, updating it regularly, and then taking it down while not telling the real (legit) reason is reckless at best, and in my view is basically the worst way they could handle it.) Whatever a realistic estimation of SpiderOak's security was before this news, I think it has to be strictly lower now, right? (Mind you...on further reflection I'm not convinced the transparency report is any more - or less - meaningful than the canary. The theory behind both is that the government cannot compel false speech. If that's true, then both are equally protective; if it's false, both are equally pointless. SpiderOak did say "if we stop updating this stop using us", and then they stopped updating it, but...then they published a transparency report saying "0 NSLs". So...maybe they're just really awful at communication.)