3 ms·
As discussed previously, TLS is old and successful, which gives you a lot more to talk about than protocols too young to say their own names and barely heard of
by tialaramex 8y ago
As discussed previously, TLS is old and successful, which gives you a lot more to talk about than protocols too young to say their own names and barely heard of outside the nerdiest circles.
The most recent example where attackers get to do a TLS downgrade is Logjam, where they tie things up for long enough to solve the Discrete Log problem and then use their solution to cover up an earlier lie so that the downgrade protection doesn't trigger.
This sort of trick also wouldn't work against TLS 1.3's downgrade protection, because rather than use a removable sentinel they baked the sentinel into the shared entropy. This sets up a catch 22. If you remove the sentinel to hide your tracks, the connection fails due to a mismatch, but if you leave the sentinel there then a client knows what's up.
- tptacek 8y agoI might just be sleep deprived from hauling myself to Vegas, but this is word salad to me. SSL 3.0 and TLS were designed by some of the best cryptographers in the world specifically to avoid downgrade attacks, and the approach failed. Obviously, TLS 1.3 doesn't have glaring downgrade attacks; its a new protocol. TLS is, as I said, a terrible example of how complicated handshaking can defend against downgrade attacks (for the best possible example of this, see DROWN, which actually manages to leverage SSL 2 attacks against TLS!). On the other hand, WireGuard can't have downgrade attacks: the precise configuration of crypto constructions used in the protocol is baked into the constructions themselves as domain separation parameters.
- tialaramex 8y agoSure, lets blame the travel. You're very kind to Paul Kocher in naming him one of the "best in the world". Maybe he'd just gone to Vegas too when he decided you could get away with abusing RSA decryption to implicitly authenticate the recipient? In grouping cross protocol attacks like DROWN in as downgrades you undo your own arguement. WireGuard with this unusual definition can become vulnerable to downgrade, bad guys might get your WireGuard v2 private keys by abusing the legacy WireGuard v1 protocol, the deliberate lack of compatibility between the two not withstanding. Of course the specifics of DROWN can't work against WireGuard, nor against TLS 1.3, but you're insisting this isn't about specifics, it's a general "lesson"
- tptacek 8y agoI'm pretty comfortable with my assessment of Kocher. It's easy to look up what he's been up to. Help me understand how exactly someone would get WireGuard's v1 Noise primitives, which bake the v1 construction identifiers and a v1 constant into the derivation of all secrets as the literal first step of the protocol, to generate something that would be comprehensible to a hypothetical v2 of the protocol.
- tialaramex 8y agoMy crystal ball is cloudy. No, no, you're right, back in 1996 the "best in the world" were incompetent buffoons, whereas today we know exactly how to do this right and we definitely haven't overlooked anything /s
- tptacek 8y agoThis isn't an answer to the question I asked, it's just huffing.
- tialaramex 8y agoYou didn't ask a question. You did ask me to "help you" see into the future and I informed you that my crystal ball is cloudy.
- tptacek 8y agoThat's a weird way to say "ok, I was wrong about it being possible to recapitulate DROWN using WireGuard v1 and any hypothetical WireGuard v2".
- tialaramex 8y agoAn ability to recognise that "I don't know a successful attack" isn't the same as "it's impossible to attack" is why I don't share your (as yet unjustified) confidence in zero agility. It's a microcosm of this thread.