3 ms·
Some backdoors can be almost impossible to detect with any kind of traditional wafer inspection tools. E.g., it might be possible to transparently cripple somet
by MertsA 8y ago
Some backdoors can be almost impossible to detect with any kind of traditional wafer inspection tools. E.g., it might be possible to transparently cripple something like Intel's RdRand instruction by changing only the doping on some of the gates inside the hardware RNG circuit. It would look completely identical under the best microscope and looking at the output wouldn't give you a good indication of whether or not you had a broken RNG or a good one. The design of Intel's RNG involved passing the output of the RNG through some whitening and IIRC AES so it might look completely random and pass every statistical test but the hardware entropy source might only realistically have 10 bits per second of real entropy.
I still think it's unlikely that someone would go through the effort to insert a super secret backdoor by surreptitiously modifying the masks but there are some interesting techniques that can make finding a backdoor almost impossible if you don't already know about it.
- kingosticks 8y agoSounds like the really cool "Stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware Trojans" paper from a few years ago. I'd forgotten about that, well worth a read for those interested. However, you must remember that as well as precise knowledge of the circuit, anyone other than an insider has close to zero chance of getting a doping change correct. Even an insider's chances are very low. And then your high-level testing is in place too. It's not common to have circuits where BIST can't give you full confidence but it happens; for things like the RNG here, also due to test tool limitations etc. So you must be doing both both general and highly targeted post-manufacturing testing also. The extent of that testing may depend on your market.