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> it'll complain about unknown keys/values or something if you use a wg-quick config with extra firewall rules and the like with plain wg. Really? I didn't eve
by StavrosK 8y ago
> it'll complain about unknown keys/values or something if you use a wg-quick config with extra firewall rules and the like with plain wg.
Really? I didn't even know that, thanks.
> if you modify your config file and down/up with wg-quick it'll delete anything you entered in your config
Ouch. Yeah, these things definitely need to be documented, I had no idea about this either. I would also like to see an easier way to configure authentications, having them in the same file as the config means I can't version control it, share it easily, etc.
- alias_neo 8y ago> I would also like to see an easier way to configure authentications Agreed. I like the way home assistant does it with a secrets.yml and you refer to your secrets by !secret <name of secret>
- Hello71 8y ago> I would also like to see an easier way to configure authentications, having them in the same file as the config means I can't version control it, share it easily, etc. The config file is designed to be very straightforward and contain only the bare minimum required configuration stanzas. If you want to separate the keys, or use a higher level key negotiation protocol (e.g. TLS), you can write your own script that calls the lower level "wg" command instead of "wg-quick". Alternatively, you can write a script that generates a wg-quick configuration file.
- zx2c4 8y agoExactly this. WireGuard and wg(8) are meant as building blocks. For example, the wg-quick(8) tool is a simple bash script I built out of wg(8) and ip(8) that mostly works for my use cases and those of some other folks. But if you want something more complicated, then it's supposed to be easy to build that out of the building blocks presented.
- chasil 8y agoWhat I am wondering is why they chose 25519. It would seem to me that offering NTRU Prime or one of the other NIST finalists would be a prudent future protection. https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Post-Quantum-Cryptography/Round-1-Submissions https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Post-Quantum-Cryptography/Rou...
- tialaramex 8y agoDoing DH with Curve25519 is a broadly understood conventional public key based key agreement scheme. We have good reason to think these are an excellent, fast, secure way to do things, unless your adversary has a working large Quantum Computer so that they can use Shor's algorithm. NTRU Prime is for a post-quantum KEM. This does, yes, solve the same piece of the puzzle in a sense. But it's essentially one enormous experiment. Huge breakthroughs in cryptanalysis for this stuff happen all the time, by next week you might believe NTRU Prime is a joke and nobody should ever have used that, which makes requiring it at the core of a new "secure" service in Linux seem like maybe a bad idea. Bernstein and co. caution, in their submission of NTRU itself, that "the security of lattice-based cryptography is not well understood. There are serious risks of further advances".
- chasil 8y agoThe docs do say: "Finally, WireGuard is cryptographically opinionated. It intentionally lacks cipher and protocol agility. If holes are found in the underlying primitives, all endpoints will be required to update." ECDH 25519 will fall like a house of cards to a capable quantum computer. Since Wireguard is already entirely DJB, the introduction of a tiny bit of agility with one of Bernstein's submissions (Classic McEliece, NTRU Prime, Post-quantum RSA-Encryption/Signature, and SPHINCS+) seems far from unreasonable. On the other hand, I'm on Oracle Linux, so I get a new kernel about once a week anyway. Swapping out might not be that traumatic for me, since I can ksplice it into critical systems. Android, however, cannot do that. p.s. ...after further reading, Wireguard does have optional, pre-shared symmetric keys. This isn't an ideal solution, but it's something anyway. "In order to mitigate any future advances in quantum computing, WireGuard also supports a mode in which any pair of peers might additionally pre-share a single 256-bit symmetric encryption key between themselves, in order to add an additional layer of symmetric encryption."