Digging a bit more into TrustTheVote, it looks like the project had serious reservations about this application from the start. From their front-page blog, for

Digging a bit more into TrustTheVote, it looks like the project had serious reservations about this application from the start. From their front-page blog, for instance: http://www.trustthevote.org/d-c-resets-timeline-for-digital-vote-by-mail-service http://www.trustthevote.org/d-c-resets-timeline-for-digital-... "Although we may not all agree with some choices made in how overseas voters are digitally empowered to participate in elections (and the OSDV Foundation for one, remains against widespread application of remote online voting services), I believe that when the efforts of the District are fairly examined, there will be consensus that Rokey Suleman and his team are making a decent effort to do the right thing." It looks like they pushed hard for a much longer and more aggressive open testing period. See also http://www.trustthevote.org/where-we-stand-%E2%80%93-update-on-the-d-c-overseas-distance-balloting-project http://www.trustthevote.org/where-we-stand-%E2%80%93-update-... Now the original post indicates security concerns spread throughout the system, not just the remote ballot return portion, so it could be there are wider architectural problems. It sounds as if there was significant concerns about this remote return piece, from a key component maker, even before the test started.