2 ms·
Baby steps. Even with invalid certificates and fairly weak crypto TLS protects us against passive eavesdroppers, which is not nothing. In 1998 if I had a fibr
by tialaramex 8y ago
Baby steps.
Even with invalid certificates and fairly weak crypto TLS protects us against passive eavesdroppers, which is not nothing.
In 1998 if I had a fibre tap for a big backbone carrier, and a line speed regex engine, I could pull matching text out of basically everything travelling over that carrier, silently and with just my small box maybe labelled "Lawful intercept capability" in one corner of one cage in one data centre.
Today that doesn't get me much, because it's encrypted. Even if it's encrypted using 3DES and RSA with a self-signed certificate for localhost, I can't read it, and I certainly can't parse it at line speed and run it through my regular expression system to keep the juicy bits, so even if I can decrypt some of that later I'll need to keep it all somewhere until I get that chance. Ugh.
So now an adversary has become _active_ and that changes the nature of the game, because while I can't detect passive eavesdroppers (except with "Quantum encryption" which is a fun lab toy but not a realistic component of everyday communications) I can detect active ones.
Not everybody cares if they're detected. I doubt Chinese or Russian intelligence agencies are much bothered that journalists visiting know they're bugged, if anything it just helps intimidate them. But if (like the afore-mentioned NSA, or Mossad) your country depends upon the pretence that it is above such shenanigans it sure is embarrassing to keep getting caught... and it also makes it much harder to pretend that everybody defending is just being paranoid.
https://starttls-everywhere.org/about/ https://starttls-everywhere.org/about/ is some next steps