4 ms·

Presumably the UK police are aware of this feature, which could lead to a more interesting situation when you can't prove that you've really unlocked to the dee

by omh 16y ago

Presumably the UK police are aware of this feature, which could lead to a more interesting situation when you can't prove that you've really unlocked to the deepest level.

ryanwaggoner 16y ago
Seems like you're giving the police a lot of credit, but maybe not. Regardless, there's really no way to prove anything either way, is there?
- dagw 16y ago
  I've met a couple of people who actually deal with computer forensics for the police and they are seriously smart people and totally on top of their game. So while you're average cop might not understand the details, they have forensics guy who certainly do. As to proving anything, my understanding is that it is theoretically impossible to prove, but sometimes bugs in the implementation or various user mistakes mean that you can, in practice, sometimes get a good indication that something is hidden,
FlemishBeeCycle 16y ago
My understanding of the feature is that is is impossible to verify whether or not you are using a hidden volume within a TC encrypted volume. Although file-hosted TrueCrypt volumes (containers) do not contain any kind of "signature" either (until decrypted, they appear to consist solely of random data), they cannot provide this kind of plausible deniability, because there is practically no plausible explanation for the existence of a file containing solely random data. However, plausible deniability can still be achieved with a file-hosted TrueCrypt volume (container) by creating a hidden volume within it. http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/?s=plausible-deniability http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/?s=plausible-deniability
- CGamesPlay 16y ago
  Clarification: it's impossible to determine if a hidden volume exists in a TrueCrypt volume. It is trivial to determine whether a given password unlocks the main, hidden, or neither volume.
  - hyperbovine 16y ago
    How is it trivial to verify whether a password unlocks something the existence of which is impossible to verify?
    - NinetyNine 16y ago
      Data about the hidden volume is encrypted and kept in the second 512 bytes of the volume, where as data about the normal volume is in the first 512 bytes. If there is no hidden volume, the second 512 bytes are purely random data. It's impossible to tell an encrypted volume header apart from random data. It's very much "try, and if you fail, you either have the wrong key or the volume doesn't exist".
pessimizer 16y ago
I'm surprised that no one has mentioned Rubberhose Deniable Encryption by Julian Assange of Wikileaks fame. That's the entire concept. Page: http://iq.org/~proff/rubberhose.org/ http://iq.org/~proff/rubberhose.org/ Description: http://iq.org/~proff/rubberhose.org/current/src/doc/maruguide/x25.html http://iq.org/~proff/rubberhose.org/current/src/doc/maruguid...
- pyre 16y ago
  This seems stale though. It's "currently available for Linux 2.2"?
  - pessimizer 16y ago
    Very stale. He moved on to other things:) But the code is available.

by omh 16y ago

Presumably the UK police are aware of this feature, which could lead to a more interesting situation when you can't prove that you've really unlocked to the deepest level.

ryanwaggoner 16y ago

Seems like you're giving the police a lot of credit, but maybe not. Regardless, there's really no way to prove anything either way, is there?

dagw 16y ago
I've met a couple of people who actually deal with computer forensics for the police and they are seriously smart people and totally on top of their game. So while you're average cop might not understand the details, they have forensics guy who certainly do. As to proving anything, my understanding is that it is theoretically impossible to prove, but sometimes bugs in the implementation or various user mistakes mean that you can, in practice, sometimes get a good indication that something is hidden,

FlemishBeeCycle 16y ago

My understanding of the feature is that is is impossible to verify whether or not you are using a hidden volume within a TC encrypted volume. Although file-hosted TrueCrypt volumes (containers) do not contain any kind of "signature" either (until decrypted, they appear to consist solely of random data), they cannot provide this kind of plausible deniability, because there is practically no plausible explanation for the existence of a file containing solely random data. However, plausible deniability can still be achieved with a file-hosted TrueCrypt volume (container) by creating a hidden volume within it. http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/?s=plausible-deniability http://www.truecrypt.org/docs/?s=plausible-deniability

CGamesPlay 16y ago
Clarification: it's impossible to determine if a hidden volume exists in a TrueCrypt volume. It is trivial to determine whether a given password unlocks the main, hidden, or neither volume.
- hyperbovine 16y ago
  How is it trivial to verify whether a password unlocks something the existence of which is impossible to verify?
  - NinetyNine 16y ago
    Data about the hidden volume is encrypted and kept in the second 512 bytes of the volume, where as data about the normal volume is in the first 512 bytes. If there is no hidden volume, the second 512 bytes are purely random data. It's impossible to tell an encrypted volume header apart from random data. It's very much "try, and if you fail, you either have the wrong key or the volume doesn't exist".

pessimizer 16y ago

I'm surprised that no one has mentioned Rubberhose Deniable Encryption by Julian Assange of Wikileaks fame. That's the entire concept. Page: http://iq.org/~proff/rubberhose.org/ http://iq.org/~proff/rubberhose.org/ Description: http://iq.org/~proff/rubberhose.org/current/src/doc/maruguide/x25.html http://iq.org/~proff/rubberhose.org/current/src/doc/maruguid...

pyre 16y ago
This seems stale though. It's "currently available for Linux 2.2"?
- pessimizer 16y ago
  Very stale. He moved on to other things:) But the code is available.