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Paul Birch [1] posted a long critique, preserved here: http://buildengineer.com/www.paulbirch.net/CritiqueOfGeorgism.html http://buildengineer.com/www.paulbirc
by SilasX 8y ago
Paul Birch [1] posted a long critique, preserved here:
http://buildengineer.com/www.paulbirch.net/CritiqueOfGeorgism.html http://buildengineer.com/www.paulbirch.net/CritiqueOfGeorgis...
Key points are in section 7-8. Key paragraphs:
>The form of land-use towards which the single tax pushes us is one in which the countryside is randomly dotted with perpendicular towers (tapering wastes land), 200 metre or so on a side, 2000 metre or so high, each tower a complete small town of 50,000 or so, inclusive of apartments, shops, offices, services and factories, but paying no more tax than a single suburban house. The internal economy of those towers will have some similarities to Type III market Georgism, but with the crucial distinction that no one who wishes to cease renting a unit when the current lease expires has any further liability; finding a new tenant is the responsibility of the tower owner. Most of the surrounding countryside will be abandoned or common land and thus effectively exempt from taxation.
>That doesn't mean that existing towns would just disappear — there is too much already invested in them — though dereliction would tend to set in over much of the urban area over the course of a century or so as abandoned properties reverted to common ownership. ...
>The problem here is that although buildings and other on-site improvements are supposed to remain purely private property, there is no easy way a landholder can remove his property without destroying it if he is outbid in the annual auction. A competing bidder might therefore risk paying considerably over the odds in the reasonable expectation of getting free use of the buildings until the following year, when the original owner may end up paying the market rental on the full property value, not merely the site value, in order to guarantee access to his own property. A sufficiently cheeky tenant could even demand rent from the property owner for allowing the property to remain on the tenant's rented land!
[1] of the British Interplanetary society; found just now that he passed in 2012.
- conanbatt 8y agoThanks for this! I will take a look. Way more sophisticated than the previous "rebutter".
- conanbatt 8y agoTook a fast read at the article. Its a pity he is so angry at Georgism in his writing, and dismissive, but nevertheless he presents a case worth hearing. The indifference vote thing is a fantastic idea, so now I know I'm a Geo-Libertarian. A fatal flaw in this essay is that it mentions LVT as a single tax. It is a bit unfair because originally, when Henry george proposed it, total public spending was very low (under 10%), not the 35% of GDP that it is today. LVT can account for 5-10% of GDP, and thus in our modern times it is only applicable as a local tax. The second issue is that it talks about the disadvantages of taxing this way, or the consequences, of which there always are some, but he does not weigh it with property taxes (which exist today), or sales taxes. There are no perfect taxes, its just the "least bad tax". Granted that a state like california already has an issue with property taxes themselves as they are not collected how they should be. Nevertheless, its the best piece I found yet against LVT.
- SilasX 8y agoGood points, all. It is important to keep in mind the difference between the Georgist position that: 1) "LVT is a positive good and governments should try to collect the entire site value of every property." vs the more moderate one that: 2) "LVT is the least bad tax and much preferable to taxing positive economic activity like labor, investment, and exchanges." I think Birch makes a good point that LVT, like all other taxes, will cause horrible distortions once it's high enough. I agree that it's hard to dispute 2), but that's a long way from the 1) promoted in Progress and Poverty. His other good point, I think, was that you don't actually want to tax the site value, but the site value's net contribution from the other sites (i.e. subtract off the positive externalities the site throws onto others), which in practice is hard to calculate, since you only observe O(n) values (land and structure prices) but need to observe a data point for every pair of properties, O(n^2), to calculate the net improvement.