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It's certainly not an emotional argument, because I actually feel kind of repulsed by the idea, but I'll try my best to outline the logic: "They're more guilty

It's certainly not an emotional argument, because I actually feel kind of repulsed by the idea, but I'll try my best to outline the logic: "They're more guilty for denying it" is equivalent to "they're less guilty for repenting", in the same sense that "I'm taller than you" is an equivalent statement to "you're shorter than me." It hinges on the idea that, if you were omniscient and knew the actual truth of what happened, you would probably feel more lenient towards a defendant who confessed their crime, versus one who denies it (again, imagine you're omniscient and you know the truth, that they really are guilty.) To tie the logic together, the key point is that court system thinks of itself as omniscient. There's no concept in the courts of "guilty but they maintain their innocence" as a separate state from "guilty". The courts aren't supposed to issue guilty verdicts if there's reasonable doubt. If you were found guilty, legally speaking you are guilty, so it follows that you must be lying if you say you're not. I'm not defending the practice... well, I defend the notion of guilty pleas getting shorter sentences because it makes for a better overall system by placing incentives on not tying up the courts any more than they need to. But I don't think of it as "let's be harsher on those that deny their crimes" so much as "let's be more lenient on those who admit them". It just happens that those statements are isomorphic.

mikeash 8y ago
You’ve done a great job of explaining how all of this logically follows from being lenient to criminals who admit guilt, but that is the sticking point. What’s the logical argument for doing that?
- ninkendo 8y ago
  Ah, sure, I'm making the assumption that one would agree that's a good thing. That's not what I was responding to originally (see fake-name's post, it's what I was replying to.) I was responding to the notion that the fallibility of the courts are the reason why we shouldn't be "less lenient" on those who maintain their innocence (because we can't be sure of their guilt.) You seem to be going farther than that: that we shouldn't be less lenient on those who maintain their innocence, even if we 100% know that they're guilty. That, of course, is a matter of opinion and there's no way to "prove" it per say, so you're right in that sense.
  - mikeash 8y ago
    I see. I agree that if you accept that premise then the rest follows, but that premise seems to be the important thing here.
dragonwriter 8y ago
> If you were found guilty, legally speaking you are guilty, so it follows that you must be lying if you say you're not. Note that absolutely does not follow. There's a difference between wrong and lying; a court may find, in a case where self-defense was claimed, that the defendant was not in reasonable, imminent fear of the kind of unlicensed harm which warrants self-defense, and it may be correct in so doing. But that does not mean that the defendant does not honestly believe they had a reasonable fear of such imminent harm, and is lying when they said they did. > well, I defend the notion of guilty pleas getting shorter sentences because it makes for a better overall system by placing incentives on not tying up the courts any more than they need to. Creating a material incentive to reduce through accountability of the executive to the public—criminal procedure doesn't just protect the defendant, it protects the public from being deceived by the executive about their response to crime—doesn't make a better system, it makes a worse system. Furtherz it encourages overcriminalization by the legislature.

mikeash 8y ago

You’ve done a great job of explaining how all of this logically follows from being lenient to criminals who admit guilt, but that is the sticking point. What’s the logical argument for doing that?

ninkendo 8y ago
Ah, sure, I'm making the assumption that one would agree that's a good thing. That's not what I was responding to originally (see fake-name's post, it's what I was replying to.) I was responding to the notion that the fallibility of the courts are the reason why we shouldn't be "less lenient" on those who maintain their innocence (because we can't be sure of their guilt.) You seem to be going farther than that: that we shouldn't be less lenient on those who maintain their innocence, even if we 100% know that they're guilty. That, of course, is a matter of opinion and there's no way to "prove" it per say, so you're right in that sense.
- mikeash 8y ago
  I see. I agree that if you accept that premise then the rest follows, but that premise seems to be the important thing here.

dragonwriter 8y ago

> If you were found guilty, legally speaking you are guilty, so it follows that you must be lying if you say you're not. Note that absolutely does not follow. There's a difference between wrong and lying; a court may find, in a case where self-defense was claimed, that the defendant was not in reasonable, imminent fear of the kind of unlicensed harm which warrants self-defense, and it may be correct in so doing. But that does not mean that the defendant does not honestly believe they had a reasonable fear of such imminent harm, and is lying when they said they did. > well, I defend the notion of guilty pleas getting shorter sentences because it makes for a better overall system by placing incentives on not tying up the courts any more than they need to. Creating a material incentive to reduce through accountability of the executive to the public—criminal procedure doesn't just protect the defendant, it protects the public from being deceived by the executive about their response to crime—doesn't make a better system, it makes a worse system. Furtherz it encourages overcriminalization by the legislature.