> The T2 chip for what I understand it's a proprietary CPU that executes proprietary software, how can you consider that secure ? It's not different from the In

> The T2 chip for what I understand it's a proprietary CPU that executes proprietary software, how can you consider that secure ? It's not different from the Intel ME in that sense, just another secondary processor that have access to all the hardware on the computer and that runs code that the user cannot control. If it ran open-source software that wouldn't make it secure. Proprietary software means it can't be independently audited for security, but whether it can be audited != whether it's actually secure. > Also for a security prospective it's not good, the main principle of cryptography is that the only secret to decrypt something should reside in the user, not in the obscurity of the algorithm or the hardware Your "main principle" is incorrect, but you are correct that obscurity of algorithm is no defense. However the T2 does not rely on obscurity of algorithm. It relies on having a private key that nobody besides the T2 has access to (not the user, not Apple, nobody) and it combines that key with the one derived from your password. This means decrypting any of that data requires two things: 1. The user password, and 2. Cooperation from the T2 chip This is strictly more secure than just relying on the password alone. > This system is NOT secure, if someone finds a flaw that permits to extract the key from the T2 chip, and it's only a matter of time and resources before someone does it, your data is no more protected, they can decrypt and extract what they want. This is incorrect. You still need the user password. If someone manages to extract the key from the T2 then they've reduced the problem back to what you'd have without the T2; namely, you need the user password to decrypt anything.