5 ms·

Yea, except YubiKey got compromised. https://www.yubico.com/support/security-advisories/ysa-2017-01/ https://www.yubico.com/support/security-advisories/ysa-201

Yea, except YubiKey got compromised. https://www.yubico.com/support/security-advisories/ysa-2017-01/ https://www.yubico.com/support/security-advisories/ysa-2017-... And, if you lose your fob or your backup fob you're boned.

iwalsh 8y ago
That vuln only affected RSA keys generated for specific niche functionality and not most uses of the YubiKey. > The issue weakens the strength of on-chip RSA key generation and affects some use cases for the Personal Identity Verification (PIV) smart card and OpenPGP functionality of the YubiKey 4 platform. Other functions of the YubiKey 4, including PIV Smart Cards with ECC keys, FIDO U2F, Yubico OTP, and OATH functions, are not affected. YubiKey NEO and FIDO U2F Security Key are not impacted.
- palisade 8y ago
  Hm, I suppose, though that is the functionality the poster I was replying to was discussing. Though, one has to wonder, what other flaws are lurking below the surface on that chip. It isn't flawless. Once there is another major issue it is going to be an abandon ship type of situation. What are the alternatives if any, move to a new key that doesn't have the problem or look into an alternative means, etc.
  - munchbunny 8y ago
    I think this is a revocation and provisioning problem: when the device is compromised, how hard is it to revoke that device and provision a new one for yourself? Structurally, actually making these tokens should be commoditized anyway. So on the software side, it needs to be not absolutely painful to rotate credentials. Something like a one-time-pad that you can use in "in case of fire break glass" situations.
    - palisade 8y ago
      Potentially difficult if you were relying on a unique product like yubikey which doesn't have a 1 to 1 competitor in the industry at the moment.
      - vel0city 8y ago
        There are many makers of FIDO U2F complaint hardware devices these days.
        deleted 8y ago
        [deleted]
        palisade 8y ago
        The original poster was discussing the OpenPGP feature. The U2F feature of YubiKey wasn't compromised by the vulnerability. The vulnerability is real and still exists. There was even someone in this HN thread that was planning to use an old key fob Arstechnica sent him, specifically for the OpenPGP feature. I should have split my backup and vulnerability comments into two, because they've sparked two unrelated debates. It started out as such a simple comment! :)
    - tialaramex 8y ago
      If you've ever used GitHub's SSH keys provisioning, any halfway decent U2F or WebAuthn implementation (including GitHub's) works a lot like that. You can register as many keys as you like within reason, you can give them names like "Yubico" or "Keyfob" or "USB Dildo" and any of them works to sign in. Once signed in you can remove any you've lost or stopped using, and add any new ones. The keys themselves have no idea where you used them (at least, affordably priced ones, you could definitely build a fancy device that obeys FIDO but actually knows what's going on rather than being as dumb as a rock) and there's no reason for your software like a browser to record it. Crypto magic means that even though neither browser nor key remembers where if anywhere you've registered, when you visit a site and say "I'm munchbunny, my password is XYZZY" it can say "You're supposed to have one of these Security Keys: Prove you still do" and it'll all just work.
- technion 8y ago
  That didn't stop me getting about 15 calls from RSA declaring Yubikey will never recover. The annoying thing with this non-issue is the FUD around it.
Boulth 8y ago
Yes, but with OpenPGP you can just rotate your subkeys. For encryption subkeys it's advised to back them up somewhere either way. It maybe you're talking about U2F applet of Yubikey? Then it's not affected by the bug you posted. And you should have backup codes enabled.
- palisade 8y ago
  The use case I gave is: You lost your backups and your main, now what? You're done. Firesale on your life or business. Backups are something everyone has to contend with in any situation, but it isn't one that has been completely solved in the security industry yet in a way that is acceptable or uniform in any way. The average user just doesn't have a clear system for providing a high level of protection for both their security and ensuring they have redundancy in their life or livelihood. There are lots of different ways to skin a cat but no one has established a definitive solution or made it easy or obvious. Something like a YubiKey is only one part of a solution, and without something more you are at risk. Or, perhaps there's a way to create an encryption with redundancies built in so you're never in that situation to begin with. What if the concept of a backup was built into the key exchange and losing your original didn't necessarily lock you out.
  - krupan 8y ago
    Is this really a part of the standard? There isn't a "I lost my token" process like there is an "I forgot my password" process on every website now?
    - deleted 8y ago
      [deleted]
jwr 8y ago
None if this affects me — I generated my keys using GnuPG and I do have backups (offline, of course).

iwalsh 8y ago

That vuln only affected RSA keys generated for specific niche functionality and not most uses of the YubiKey. > The issue weakens the strength of on-chip RSA key generation and affects some use cases for the Personal Identity Verification (PIV) smart card and OpenPGP functionality of the YubiKey 4 platform. Other functions of the YubiKey 4, including PIV Smart Cards with ECC keys, FIDO U2F, Yubico OTP, and OATH functions, are not affected. YubiKey NEO and FIDO U2F Security Key are not impacted.

palisade 8y ago
Hm, I suppose, though that is the functionality the poster I was replying to was discussing. Though, one has to wonder, what other flaws are lurking below the surface on that chip. It isn't flawless. Once there is another major issue it is going to be an abandon ship type of situation. What are the alternatives if any, move to a new key that doesn't have the problem or look into an alternative means, etc.
- munchbunny 8y ago
  I think this is a revocation and provisioning problem: when the device is compromised, how hard is it to revoke that device and provision a new one for yourself? Structurally, actually making these tokens should be commoditized anyway. So on the software side, it needs to be not absolutely painful to rotate credentials. Something like a one-time-pad that you can use in "in case of fire break glass" situations.
  - palisade 8y ago
    Potentially difficult if you were relying on a unique product like yubikey which doesn't have a 1 to 1 competitor in the industry at the moment.
    - vel0city 8y ago
      There are many makers of FIDO U2F complaint hardware devices these days.
      - deleted 8y ago
        [deleted]
      - palisade 8y ago
        The original poster was discussing the OpenPGP feature. The U2F feature of YubiKey wasn't compromised by the vulnerability. The vulnerability is real and still exists. There was even someone in this HN thread that was planning to use an old key fob Arstechnica sent him, specifically for the OpenPGP feature. I should have split my backup and vulnerability comments into two, because they've sparked two unrelated debates. It started out as such a simple comment! :)
  - tialaramex 8y ago
    If you've ever used GitHub's SSH keys provisioning, any halfway decent U2F or WebAuthn implementation (including GitHub's) works a lot like that. You can register as many keys as you like within reason, you can give them names like "Yubico" or "Keyfob" or "USB Dildo" and any of them works to sign in. Once signed in you can remove any you've lost or stopped using, and add any new ones. The keys themselves have no idea where you used them (at least, affordably priced ones, you could definitely build a fancy device that obeys FIDO but actually knows what's going on rather than being as dumb as a rock) and there's no reason for your software like a browser to record it. Crypto magic means that even though neither browser nor key remembers where if anywhere you've registered, when you visit a site and say "I'm munchbunny, my password is XYZZY" it can say "You're supposed to have one of these Security Keys: Prove you still do" and it'll all just work.
technion 8y ago
That didn't stop me getting about 15 calls from RSA declaring Yubikey will never recover. The annoying thing with this non-issue is the FUD around it.

Boulth 8y ago

Yes, but with OpenPGP you can just rotate your subkeys. For encryption subkeys it's advised to back them up somewhere either way. It maybe you're talking about U2F applet of Yubikey? Then it's not affected by the bug you posted. And you should have backup codes enabled.

palisade 8y ago
The use case I gave is: You lost your backups and your main, now what? You're done. Firesale on your life or business. Backups are something everyone has to contend with in any situation, but it isn't one that has been completely solved in the security industry yet in a way that is acceptable or uniform in any way. The average user just doesn't have a clear system for providing a high level of protection for both their security and ensuring they have redundancy in their life or livelihood. There are lots of different ways to skin a cat but no one has established a definitive solution or made it easy or obvious. Something like a YubiKey is only one part of a solution, and without something more you are at risk. Or, perhaps there's a way to create an encryption with redundancies built in so you're never in that situation to begin with. What if the concept of a backup was built into the key exchange and losing your original didn't necessarily lock you out.
- krupan 8y ago
  Is this really a part of the standard? There isn't a "I lost my token" process like there is an "I forgot my password" process on every website now?
  - deleted 8y ago
    [deleted]

jwr 8y ago

None if this affects me — I generated my keys using GnuPG and I do have backups (offline, of course).