3 ms·
> Devices now need state, pushing up the base price. We want these things to be cheap enough to give away. State is only expensive when it adds a significant a
by klodolph 8y ago
> Devices now need state, pushing up the base price. We want these things to be cheap enough to give away.
State is only expensive when it adds a significant amount of die area or forces you to add additional ICs. If you need a ton of flash memory, you can't put it on the same die because the process is different, and adding a second IC bumps up the cost. However, staying with the same process you used for your microcontroller, you can add some flash with much worse performance... which is a viable alternative if you only need a handful of bits. Your flash is slower and needs more die area, but it's good enough.
> The counter make tokens weakly trackable. If Facebook knows your token's counter was 205 when you signed in at work this morning and 217 when you signed in from your iMac this evening, somebody who visited GitHub at midday with counter 213 might be you, someone with counter 487 definitely isn't you, or at least not with the same token.
What kind of ridiculous threat model is this? "Alice logs into Facebook and GitHub, and Bob, who has compromised both Facebook and GitHub's authentication services..." Even then, it's not guaranteed, because the device might be using a different counter for Facebook and GitHub.
- testplzignore 8y ago> the device might be using a different counter for Facebook and GitHub. At least for YubiKey, it appears to use a global counter: https://developers.yubico.com/U2F/Protocol_details/Key_generation.html https://developers.yubico.com/U2F/Protocol_details/Key_gener... > There is a global use counter which gets incremented upon each authentication, and this is the only state of the YubiKey that gets modified in this step. This counter is shared between credentials. Having a global counter does seem like it could weaken the ability to detect cloned keys. If an attacker could clone the key and know the usage pattern (e.g., there are usually 100 uses of non-Facebook services between uses of the Facebook service), then they might be able to use it for a while without being detected. Though, having service-specific counters may have worse security ramifications (e.g., storing which services the key has been used with). Though if an attacker is going to that much trouble, they may as well just use the wrench-to-the-head method.
- vel0city 8y agoThe main benefit is that the number should always be increasing. The moment either key uses an old number, the service knows the security device was cloned. The attacker will have to be sure not to increment it more than the target or else an attempt by the target would notify of the cloned key.
- bzbarsky 8y agoKeep in mind that "Bob" in this threat model is Facebook (because they are one of the entities that tries to track what everyone is doing everywhere). So it only needs to get the Github nonce. Collusion on the part of Github is, I suspect, much more likely than Facebook compromising Github's login flow. Maybe sites colluding with their ad providers to track people is not part of your threat model, but it definitely is for some people. Yes, I know Github does not host ads, so isn't a good example of this threat model.