The article describes what happens under the launch on warning (LOW) policy. It's not clear if the US has LOW policy. It seems like Clinton administration made

The article describes what happens under the launch on warning (LOW) policy. It's not clear if the US has LOW policy. It seems like Clinton administration made some changes to the policy after the Cold War. It's more like launch under attack (LUA). If the US has credible second strike capability and command chain that survives decapitation attack, there is no need hurry. Mistake can be catastrophically. Confirming nuclear explosions first would seem as sane default even if you want to keep others guessing what the real presidential decision directive is. Clinton Issues New Guidelines on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Doctrine https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997_11-12/pdd https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997_11-12/pdd >Bell said the press had incorrectly indicated that the PDD "still allows" the United States to launch nuclear weapons upon receiving warning of an attack. Bell emphasized that "there is no change in this PDD with respect to U.S. policy on launch on warning and that policy is that we do not, not rely on it." In fact, Bell said "in this PDD we direct our military forces to continue to posture themselves in such a way as to not rely on launch on warning—to be able to absorb a nuclear strike and still have enough force surviving to constitute credible deterrence." >Bell pointed out that while the United States has always had the "technical capability" to implement a policy of launch on warning, it has chosen not to do so. "Our policy is to confirm that we are under nuclear attack with actual detonations before retaliating," he said.