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This reminds me of someone who once told me that the vast majority of philosophical problems are self-inflicted and caused by the intentional use of vague and a

This reminds me of someone who once told me that the vast majority of philosophical problems are self-inflicted and caused by the intentional use of vague and ambiguous definitions, and therefore could be solved trivially simply by agreeing on a definition for something. One example given was the Theseu's Paradox (or The Ship of Theseus): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship_of_Theseus https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship_of_Theseus The entire problem only exists because you're intentionally using a vague term in the problem, therefore causing the problem itself. At least that was the commentary, I'm not an expert in the subject, and I'm sure many will disagree. But then, even the disagreeing is just pointlessly creating a problem for the sake of the discussion.

woodruffw 8y ago
Which vague term? The problem in The Ship of Theseus is one of identity: do objects have historical properties (i.e., do they undergo change but remain "the thing"), or do they become new objects when change occurs? Taking either horn leads to radical conclusions about the objects we interact with on a daily basis, and so we have a paradox. There are plenty of examples of vague and ambiguous language in philosophy, but I think that the SoT remains problematic without them.
- dooglius 8y ago
  This is just moving to vagueness in the definition of "object". >Taking either horn leads to radical conclusions about the objects we interact with on a daily basis How would someone deal with objects in the real world differently based on a solution to this supposed problem? In what context is the distinction important?
  - woodruffw 8y ago
    By "object," I just mean "a thing in the world." We can talk in particulars: a candle, a ship, whatever. I don't disagree that there's plenty of room for vagueness there, but I don't think that either of us has particularly vague definitions of "object" in mind. > How would someone deal with objects in the real world differently based on a solution to this supposed problem? The simplest example is in the second case: if we were to conclude that objects don't contain historical properties, then we would be hard pressed to accept any sort of continuity. Am I the same person as I was a moment ago? Am I responsible for "my" future actions, even if it's not "me"? The first case also has problems: if objects encapsulate their historical properties, then how did we end up with two objects? Which one of them is the "real" one, i.e. the one with the name "Theseus's Ship"?
    - ucaetano 8y ago
      > By "object," I just mean "a thing in the world." We can talk in particulars: a candle, a ship, whatever. That is still a vague definition. Are you talking about the set of matter (atoms, etc.) in their certain relative positions and interactions? Are you talking about the general usefulness? Defining object in this sense (as in the object "ship of Theseus") will solve the problem of SoT.
      - andrepd 8y ago
        That is exactly the question. When, in your daily life, or in law, or in your dealings, you talk about an "object", which do you mean?
    - dooglius 8y ago
      What would it mean if objects didn't "contain historical properties"? What would it mean if they did? What would be different if you were "responsible" for your future actions versus if you weren't? Let me give some examples of where the distinction could actually be meaningful: Logistically, the museum can only put one of the ships up for display. Which one should it choose? The museum hires you to compile a database of all its historical items that can be browsed online. Should you put the "Ships of Theseus" in a single row, or two rows, one for each ship? A rich and extravagant museum visitor, after seeing the ship on display (whichever one that is), offers the museum a generous sum to purchase it. Later, when he learns of the second ship, he is outraged and demands his money back. Should the museum reverse the deal? Prior to the second ship being reconstructed, the museum had taken out an insurance policy on the "Ship of Theseus". Later, when there are two ships in existence, the second ship burns down in an unfortunate fire. Should the insurance company compensate the museum? Would it matter if the other ship burned instead? After finding and deciphering ancient journals from the Theseus crew, the museum learns that treasure may be hidden within the wood of the ship. Which ship should be searched? The museum trades one of the ships to a neighboring museum in exchange for other historical items. Later, both museums begin advertising that they have the original Ship of Theseus on display. Should both be allowed to advertise this? These examples give, I think, differing and nuanced notions of what the "Ship of Theseus", and even an "object" is. There is no reason why there should be a singular "right answer" that applies universally, without a sense of what question is being asked or what problem needs to be solved.
- ucaetano 8y ago
  > Which vague term? "the same", as in "is it the same ship?".
- Felz 8y ago
  Identity is not a concept the universe recognizes. The basic building blocks of the universe provably have no identity; all atoms composed the same are interchangeable. Of course a philosopher would never realize that, because they'd never bother looking hard enough to get to quantum mechanics. There is no Ship of Theseusness that gets transferred at any point. You just built a leaky abstraction over how things really work, and surprise: it's leaky.
  - andrepd 8y ago
    If we reduced the world to only fundamental concepts and discarded everything else... Well basic physics would survive, and not much else. Nonetheless there is knowledge beyond fundamental physics, meaningful knowledge.
  - c3534l 8y ago
    I'm afraid you're actually engaging in the Ship of Theseus problem there. Your conclusion about why the Ship of Theseus is not actually a paradox is the very point of the parable. Another person might suggest that objects really are things. In fact, I would. If you replaced every atom in my body with a different atom of the same type, would I still be me? I would argue yes, that you've not made an identical copy of me. You're clearly taking a philosophical position on the meaning of the parable, yet pretending you're not doing philosophy in the process. It seems that's what a lot of people in this thread chain are doing, assuming their interpretation is the correct one and that philosophy is therefor BS to even ask the question. Everyone does philosophy all the time, but some people do it completely uninformed of the thousands of years of debate we've had on it.
    - Felz 8y ago
      > If you replaced every atom in my body with a different atom of the same type, would I still be me? I would argue yes, that you've not made an identical copy of me. I don't agree with everything Yudkowsky says, but he makes my point here: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/Bp8vnEciPA5TXSy6f/can-you-prove-two-particles-are-identical https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/Bp8vnEciPA5TXSy6f/can-you-pr... There is no "if you replaced every atom in your body". That's not even describable with what we know of the universe's fundamentals. It's an abstraction we layer on top so we can make sense of it. There is no useful debate about whether it's true or not, because it's just something we choose. I'm not taking a position. I'm dissolving the question. I don't care if that's secretly "doing philosophy" or not. If it upsets you that I think there's no value in "thousands of years of debate" and things that most people would consider philosophy, prove me wrong.
zukzuk 8y ago
I think you're missing something really profound here. I wrote my masters thesis on identity problems in version control systems (Git, Mercurial, Subversion, and the like). These systems are forced to take a stance on the Ship of Theseus problem — they're tracking the identity of files/documents whose entire contents, name, and format may change over time. Different systems have chosen to take very different stances on this. As it turns out, taking a stance on what makes a file a file (or a ship a ship) — being explicit rather than vague — does not solve the problem. Not even close. In fact, one of the many little things that make Git a brilliant piece of software is that it refuses to take a stance on identity. Git is intentionally vague about what makes a file a file. It doesn't actually track it at all — file identity is determined retroactively. It's a question for which Git intentionally doesn't have a straight answer. What I think is really fascinating about all of this is that computers are forcing us to deal with age-old philosophical problems head on. These are not just interesting riddles anymore. They're real problems that need concrete solutions. Event more interestingly, there is something in this that establishes computing as categorically different from just pure mathematics. Computing forces us to bridge abstraction with the real world — to answer questions like what is the relationship between an abstract model and the thing that is being modelled. This to me is really exciting, and what follows from it can't be easily dismissed with a comment like "most philosophical problems only exist because language is vague".
- ucaetano 8y ago
  > These systems are forced to take a stance on the Ship of Theseus problem — they're tracking the identity of files/documents whose entire contents, name, and format may change over time. But that's my point: when you choose to make a call on the definition os "the same", the problem no longer exists. SoT only exists while you refuse to provide a more precise definition for "the same". > Different systems have chosen to take very different stances on this. Yes, and any stance will solve the problem. You could say that it is the Schrodinger's Cat of philosophy: the moment you decide to go one level deeper (open the box and observe the cat), the problem ceases to exist. > These are not just interesting riddles anymore Agreed, and the point of the original commentary was that they were never interesting riddles to start with, they were only riddles at all because we purposefully forced them to be riddles. We avoided the fact simply to carry on the discussion. Similarly, any judge won't care about the SoT, because at the end of the day, that judge will have to make a call if the ship in question is Theseus' or not. And just like quantum mechanics, the moment you look at it, the "wave function collapses" and you have a solution. SoT is only a problem for the same duration as Schrodinger's cat: while you refuse to open the box.
woozyolliew 8y ago
Reminds me of Trigger’s broom https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=LAh8HryVaeY https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=LAh8HryVaeY

woodruffw 8y ago

Which vague term? The problem in The Ship of Theseus is one of identity: do objects have historical properties (i.e., do they undergo change but remain "the thing"), or do they become new objects when change occurs? Taking either horn leads to radical conclusions about the objects we interact with on a daily basis, and so we have a paradox. There are plenty of examples of vague and ambiguous language in philosophy, but I think that the SoT remains problematic without them.

dooglius 8y ago
This is just moving to vagueness in the definition of "object". >Taking either horn leads to radical conclusions about the objects we interact with on a daily basis How would someone deal with objects in the real world differently based on a solution to this supposed problem? In what context is the distinction important?
- woodruffw 8y ago
  By "object," I just mean "a thing in the world." We can talk in particulars: a candle, a ship, whatever. I don't disagree that there's plenty of room for vagueness there, but I don't think that either of us has particularly vague definitions of "object" in mind. > How would someone deal with objects in the real world differently based on a solution to this supposed problem? The simplest example is in the second case: if we were to conclude that objects don't contain historical properties, then we would be hard pressed to accept any sort of continuity. Am I the same person as I was a moment ago? Am I responsible for "my" future actions, even if it's not "me"? The first case also has problems: if objects encapsulate their historical properties, then how did we end up with two objects? Which one of them is the "real" one, i.e. the one with the name "Theseus's Ship"?
  - ucaetano 8y ago
    > By "object," I just mean "a thing in the world." We can talk in particulars: a candle, a ship, whatever. That is still a vague definition. Are you talking about the set of matter (atoms, etc.) in their certain relative positions and interactions? Are you talking about the general usefulness? Defining object in this sense (as in the object "ship of Theseus") will solve the problem of SoT.
    - andrepd 8y ago
      That is exactly the question. When, in your daily life, or in law, or in your dealings, you talk about an "object", which do you mean?
  - dooglius 8y ago
    What would it mean if objects didn't "contain historical properties"? What would it mean if they did? What would be different if you were "responsible" for your future actions versus if you weren't? Let me give some examples of where the distinction could actually be meaningful: Logistically, the museum can only put one of the ships up for display. Which one should it choose? The museum hires you to compile a database of all its historical items that can be browsed online. Should you put the "Ships of Theseus" in a single row, or two rows, one for each ship? A rich and extravagant museum visitor, after seeing the ship on display (whichever one that is), offers the museum a generous sum to purchase it. Later, when he learns of the second ship, he is outraged and demands his money back. Should the museum reverse the deal? Prior to the second ship being reconstructed, the museum had taken out an insurance policy on the "Ship of Theseus". Later, when there are two ships in existence, the second ship burns down in an unfortunate fire. Should the insurance company compensate the museum? Would it matter if the other ship burned instead? After finding and deciphering ancient journals from the Theseus crew, the museum learns that treasure may be hidden within the wood of the ship. Which ship should be searched? The museum trades one of the ships to a neighboring museum in exchange for other historical items. Later, both museums begin advertising that they have the original Ship of Theseus on display. Should both be allowed to advertise this? These examples give, I think, differing and nuanced notions of what the "Ship of Theseus", and even an "object" is. There is no reason why there should be a singular "right answer" that applies universally, without a sense of what question is being asked or what problem needs to be solved.
ucaetano 8y ago
> Which vague term? "the same", as in "is it the same ship?".
Felz 8y ago
Identity is not a concept the universe recognizes. The basic building blocks of the universe provably have no identity; all atoms composed the same are interchangeable. Of course a philosopher would never realize that, because they'd never bother looking hard enough to get to quantum mechanics. There is no Ship of Theseusness that gets transferred at any point. You just built a leaky abstraction over how things really work, and surprise: it's leaky.
- andrepd 8y ago
  If we reduced the world to only fundamental concepts and discarded everything else... Well basic physics would survive, and not much else. Nonetheless there is knowledge beyond fundamental physics, meaningful knowledge.
- c3534l 8y ago
  I'm afraid you're actually engaging in the Ship of Theseus problem there. Your conclusion about why the Ship of Theseus is not actually a paradox is the very point of the parable. Another person might suggest that objects really are things. In fact, I would. If you replaced every atom in my body with a different atom of the same type, would I still be me? I would argue yes, that you've not made an identical copy of me. You're clearly taking a philosophical position on the meaning of the parable, yet pretending you're not doing philosophy in the process. It seems that's what a lot of people in this thread chain are doing, assuming their interpretation is the correct one and that philosophy is therefor BS to even ask the question. Everyone does philosophy all the time, but some people do it completely uninformed of the thousands of years of debate we've had on it.
  - Felz 8y ago
    > If you replaced every atom in my body with a different atom of the same type, would I still be me? I would argue yes, that you've not made an identical copy of me. I don't agree with everything Yudkowsky says, but he makes my point here: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/Bp8vnEciPA5TXSy6f/can-you-prove-two-particles-are-identical https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/Bp8vnEciPA5TXSy6f/can-you-pr... There is no "if you replaced every atom in your body". That's not even describable with what we know of the universe's fundamentals. It's an abstraction we layer on top so we can make sense of it. There is no useful debate about whether it's true or not, because it's just something we choose. I'm not taking a position. I'm dissolving the question. I don't care if that's secretly "doing philosophy" or not. If it upsets you that I think there's no value in "thousands of years of debate" and things that most people would consider philosophy, prove me wrong.

zukzuk 8y ago

I think you're missing something really profound here. I wrote my masters thesis on identity problems in version control systems (Git, Mercurial, Subversion, and the like). These systems are forced to take a stance on the Ship of Theseus problem — they're tracking the identity of files/documents whose entire contents, name, and format may change over time. Different systems have chosen to take very different stances on this. As it turns out, taking a stance on what makes a file a file (or a ship a ship) — being explicit rather than vague — does not solve the problem. Not even close. In fact, one of the many little things that make Git a brilliant piece of software is that it refuses to take a stance on identity. Git is intentionally vague about what makes a file a file. It doesn't actually track it at all — file identity is determined retroactively. It's a question for which Git intentionally doesn't have a straight answer. What I think is really fascinating about all of this is that computers are forcing us to deal with age-old philosophical problems head on. These are not just interesting riddles anymore. They're real problems that need concrete solutions. Event more interestingly, there is something in this that establishes computing as categorically different from just pure mathematics. Computing forces us to bridge abstraction with the real world — to answer questions like what is the relationship between an abstract model and the thing that is being modelled. This to me is really exciting, and what follows from it can't be easily dismissed with a comment like "most philosophical problems only exist because language is vague".

ucaetano 8y ago
> These systems are forced to take a stance on the Ship of Theseus problem — they're tracking the identity of files/documents whose entire contents, name, and format may change over time. But that's my point: when you choose to make a call on the definition os "the same", the problem no longer exists. SoT only exists while you refuse to provide a more precise definition for "the same". > Different systems have chosen to take very different stances on this. Yes, and any stance will solve the problem. You could say that it is the Schrodinger's Cat of philosophy: the moment you decide to go one level deeper (open the box and observe the cat), the problem ceases to exist. > These are not just interesting riddles anymore Agreed, and the point of the original commentary was that they were never interesting riddles to start with, they were only riddles at all because we purposefully forced them to be riddles. We avoided the fact simply to carry on the discussion. Similarly, any judge won't care about the SoT, because at the end of the day, that judge will have to make a call if the ship in question is Theseus' or not. And just like quantum mechanics, the moment you look at it, the "wave function collapses" and you have a solution. SoT is only a problem for the same duration as Schrodinger's cat: while you refuse to open the box.

woozyolliew 8y ago

Reminds me of Trigger’s broom https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=LAh8HryVaeY https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=LAh8HryVaeY