3 ms·
In order to support reliable mass-remote-update, what is needed is an ME which is disabled by default but can be enabled via a non-reversible opt-in, such as br
by rectang 8y ago
In order to support reliable mass-remote-update, what is needed is an ME which is disabled by default but can be enabled via a non-reversible opt-in, such as breaking off a pin.
Then a supplier could configure bulk orders to enable the ME and it would be left up to the customer to choose the security-for-convenience tradeoff.
- jake_the_third 8y agoWhy break off? Normal physical switches on motherboards work just as well.
- rectang 8y agoMy reasoning was that the step needed to be non-reversible in order to duplicate the current behavior. However, after thinking over your suggestion, I haven't come up with a scenario where that would be important. Ordinary users, even if they somehow experienced the temptation to disable remote updates, wouldn't have the expertise to act on it. And any malicious actor with physical access to the machine would have other more straightforward attack vectors (like USB vulns). So I think you're right -- and Intel has even less justification for hard-wiring the ME on by default.