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I wonder what other (somehow) laptop-worthy CPUs offer a better management engine story? * AMD processors do have an equivalent management engine (PSP), but I
by nine_k 8y ago
I wonder what other (somehow) laptop-worthy CPUs offer a better management engine story?
* AMD processors do have an equivalent management engine (PSP), but I didn't hear anything about remote exploits for it.
* Beefier ARM CPUs also have something like a management engine ("trustzone" only accessible to the manufacturer). I have no idea if it has any remote-access capabilities on any common hardware. On RPi the trustzone is absent.
* Power9 does have a management engine, but it's open and you can upload your own management code. The CPU is not an option for a laptop, and hardly even for a desktop, though.
(Edited: spelling.)
- zzzcpan 8y agoI believe AMD lets you disable it from BIOS.
- ttctciyf 8y agoI've seen this claim a few times but never seen it solidly verified. Can anyone make the case either way?
- zzzcpan 8y agoWell, we don't know what disabling PSP does, but we know there is an option in BIOS to do that: https://www.google.com/search?q=BIOS+psp+support&tbm=isch https://www.google.com/search?q=BIOS+psp+support&tbm=isch
- ttctciyf 8y agoYeah, I'm aware of the BIOS option, but haven't seen any reliably sourced info on what its exact effect is.
- rectang 8y agoIn order to support reliable mass-remote-update, what is needed is an ME which is disabled by default but can be enabled via a non-reversible opt-in, such as breaking off a pin. Then a supplier could configure bulk orders to enable the ME and it would be left up to the customer to choose the security-for-convenience tradeoff.
- jake_the_third 8y agoWhy break off? Normal physical switches on motherboards work just as well.
- rectang 8y agoMy reasoning was that the step needed to be non-reversible in order to duplicate the current behavior. However, after thinking over your suggestion, I haven't come up with a scenario where that would be important. Ordinary users, even if they somehow experienced the temptation to disable remote updates, wouldn't have the expertise to act on it. And any malicious actor with physical access to the machine would have other more straightforward attack vectors (like USB vulns). So I think you're right -- and Intel has even less justification for hard-wiring the ME on by default.