Interesting. Apparently he needs to assume a particular multiverse theory to prove it. While I don't object to those on principle, I don't believe they're neede

Interesting. Apparently he needs to assume a particular multiverse theory to prove it. While I don't object to those on principle, I don't believe they're needed to prove heuristic, good enough versions of Ockham’s Razor that work in the real world (albeit without guarantees), based on the arguments outlined on the previous comments. > The latter is important because some theories trade off between these two: e.g. a multiverse theory might have simple equations ("every possibility happens somewhere") but require very precise "coordinates" to pin-point the actual possibility that we observe. I think this is an important observation that's quite obvious for ML researchers et al but again seems to escape current physics discussions. An example is the endless drama about "Fine tuning": if your new theory requires many less bits for equation description, that it requires fine tuning is irrelevant as long as the additional model parameter precision uses less bits -- then it should be the preferred candidate. W.r.t. [computational] multiverse theories (and variants such as Tegmark's MUH, Schimidhuber's, and others), I do believe they're an inevitable progression of physics/philosophy. I just think it's a bit pretentious to have any certain about a particular flavor. I feel there's still much philosophical and mathematical ground to be covered; it tests the limits of our imagination. It seriously feels like a very important step for humanity at large though -- finally approaching metaphysical theories that actually make sense, and explain the basis of much about humanity, existence, ethics, etc. I think it's an important void to be filled after the decline of religion, hopefully in coonjunction with the spread of humanism.