> Reality is its internal model of the external world informed by imperfect sensory inputs. Consciousness is what thinking feels like. Problem is, these are va

> Reality is its internal model of the external world informed by imperfect sensory inputs. Consciousness is what thinking feels like. Problem is, these are vague claims that many would disagree with. It's not that simple. Why does thinking feel like anything? What does "feel" even mean? The mystery is, why does moving physical particles in the brain sometimes trigger the perception of "seeing green" and sometimes it triggers the feeling of tiredness? Or what about this thought experiment. You probably believe that a computer program can feel pain. But you can execute the program by hand, with pen and paper. Does this create the feeling of pain too? > As far as I'm concerned, after Wittgenstein, philosophy has had nothing to do. All the "big questions" are either answerable scientifically as a matter of neurology or they're ill-posed and nonsensical. I agree with the sentiment. I think most of philosophy is BS, lot of words about nothing and most questions are really about linguistic - once you properly define terms, the problem disappears. But the problem of consciousness is an exception.