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What keeps the webmail company from supplying you with modified client-side JS code which forwards the keys you enter to $three_letter_agency?

by limmeau 16y ago

baltcode 16y ago
Exactly, and I think that's a potential problem with hushmail (but those guys are to be commended for some honesty). How about a number of independent, hacker type, or FSF type communities certify the client side JS through md5 digests on the client side code or the like?
- limmeau 16y ago
  But how do I verify that the JS code being served to me in this moment is the version audited by the trusted party? AFAIK, mainstream browsers have no button to compute a hash over the contents of a website. (And it's not just reusable JS libraries one would have to audit and checksum; the HTML code of individually rendered message pages could also contain JS code to subvert the security).
  - rwolf 16y ago
    Take a look at Aldo Cortesi's AppHash for one impl of verification of code right when it loads on the page.
    - tptacek 16y ago
      Cortesi doesn't have a solution to this problem for unmodified browsers. If you get to modify the browser, you're no longer talking about "web mail"; you might as well just write a real secure mail client, and use HTML5 for your cross-platform UI. I find Cortesi's promotion of his web crypto tools pretty close to the "dishonesty" line. He's not dishonest. But whether he knows it or not, he's coming as close to the line as he can. People keep telling him, browsers can't safely do the things he's telling people they do. He keeps disregarding them.
      - baltcode 16y ago
        Yes, but a firefox add-on is easier than a mail client. Cortesi's solution still leaves out the problem of asymmetric encryption, and storing private keys though.
- danudey 16y ago
  Hush mail has the benefit of being located in Canada, meaning they aren't beholden to the Patriot Act (i.e. they aren't forbidden from telling you if someone wants your mail), and the FBI, etc. have to go through the RCMP to get a warrant. Now, someone just breaking into their servers, on the other hand, is another matter.
rdl 16y ago
Right, and they only have to give it to you once to steal the passphrase, and only have to give it to one or two persons of interest, not necessarily everyone, so it can be very difficult to detect. If they were smart, they'd also check headers and other info to try to prevent serving the trojaned page to someone who might be auditing.

What keeps the webmail company from supplying you with modified client-side JS code which forwards the keys you enter to $three_letter_agency?

by limmeau 16y ago

What keeps the webmail company from supplying you with modified client-side JS code which forwards the keys you enter to $three_letter_agency?

baltcode 16y ago

Exactly, and I think that's a potential problem with hushmail (but those guys are to be commended for some honesty). How about a number of independent, hacker type, or FSF type communities certify the client side JS through md5 digests on the client side code or the like?

limmeau 16y ago
But how do I verify that the JS code being served to me in this moment is the version audited by the trusted party? AFAIK, mainstream browsers have no button to compute a hash over the contents of a website. (And it's not just reusable JS libraries one would have to audit and checksum; the HTML code of individually rendered message pages could also contain JS code to subvert the security).
- rwolf 16y ago
  Take a look at Aldo Cortesi's AppHash for one impl of verification of code right when it loads on the page.
  - tptacek 16y ago
    Cortesi doesn't have a solution to this problem for unmodified browsers. If you get to modify the browser, you're no longer talking about "web mail"; you might as well just write a real secure mail client, and use HTML5 for your cross-platform UI. I find Cortesi's promotion of his web crypto tools pretty close to the "dishonesty" line. He's not dishonest. But whether he knows it or not, he's coming as close to the line as he can. People keep telling him, browsers can't safely do the things he's telling people they do. He keeps disregarding them.
    - baltcode 16y ago
      Yes, but a firefox add-on is easier than a mail client. Cortesi's solution still leaves out the problem of asymmetric encryption, and storing private keys though.
danudey 16y ago
Hush mail has the benefit of being located in Canada, meaning they aren't beholden to the Patriot Act (i.e. they aren't forbidden from telling you if someone wants your mail), and the FBI, etc. have to go through the RCMP to get a warrant. Now, someone just breaking into their servers, on the other hand, is another matter.

rdl 16y ago

Right, and they only have to give it to you once to steal the passphrase, and only have to give it to one or two persons of interest, not necessarily everyone, so it can be very difficult to detect. If they were smart, they'd also check headers and other info to try to prevent serving the trojaned page to someone who might be auditing.