5 ms·

Not to mention that transporters (disassembler/reassemblers) are (a) murder machines, and (b) cloning machines.

ddingus 8y ago
Ha! As far as I can tell, this "me" and that "you" exchanging thoughts right now, are one offs, a delicate state, aware. One day, cloning, assumung we can do it in a non destrucrive way, and I am not convinced that will ever be true, would make another one. That one will diverge quickly from us as it's experiences would differ. I am not convinced it is possible to avoid that happening either. The transporter is such an interesting idea! But, using it would have to come with a bit different idea and acceptance of identity. The idea of a "me" continuing on, doing what I would have done, is plausible. The shared experiences make for a reality, also shared. That is where identity would lie. To understand if we are talking to a Kirk, post transport, our validation would basically be done with what is known, shared among those asking the question. It is all like sleeping, only to wonder if the same person awakens. In terms of a body holding a state, stream of experiences, yes. But, in terms of that person, as in would they pass the "talking to Kirk?" test, perhaps not. Ever meet someone after a coma, or even long surgery and experience a lack of congruence? Does not always happen, but it can. That is an example of that state being changed, yet the stream of experiences remaining intact. (As much as it can during times of long sleep, coma, and so forth)
- squirrelicus 8y ago
  Not to trivialize the great unsolved question of WTF is consciousness... I think it's a bit easier to reason about this problem than you think. For example, generally Star Trek wants us to presume the murder and cloning occur simultaneously. Let's say they don't. In the case that the murder occurs before the cloning, the waters are admittedly still muddy. Is it, in fact, like waking up from a sleep? Not very easy to tell. However, if we presume that the murder occurs after the cloning, things become quite clear. There can definitely only be one physical me in which I am conscious -- I feel comfortable rejecting an assertion that I would experience multiple simultaneous consciousnesses of a sequence of atomwise clones. Therefore, we work backwards. If I can't experience more than one consciousness simultaneously, then I can't experience two. If you clone me, I am not that clone, I am still the original. As the time between cloning and murdering (t) approaches zero, the same holds true. I am comfortable asserting there's nothing special about consciousness that would cause instantaneous consciousness transfer as (t) reaches zero and then becomes negative. Therefore a transporter clone will not be me from my perspective. Therefore the murder is my death, and the cloning is a birth of a new completely separate consciousness that I will never experience.
  - lisper 8y ago
    > If I can't experience more than one consciousness simultaneously, then I can't experience two. One of you can't, but two of you might be able to :-) Kind of like how one core can't do real simultaneous multi-tasking, but two cores can.
    - squirrelicus 8y ago
      Right. From a purely material standpoint, I agree that from the outside perspective, there are two identical MEs and any claims to legitimacy, originality, or specialness will be completely dubious. But I think it's easy to demonstrate that it would not be like waking up and the "true original" would definitely die in that it would not experience the clone's consciousness
      - lisper 8y ago
        > it's easy to demonstrate that it would not be like waking up Really? How would you demonstrate that?
        squirrelicus 8y ago
        If you do not believe the parent of your last comment does so I would like to hear your thoughts
        lisper 8y ago
        Imagine that we have the technology to cryogenically freeze and revive you with your subjective sense of self intact. Now consider two scenarios: Scenario 1: We freeze you, move your body to a different location, and revive you. Scenario 2: We freeze you, make an atomic copy of the frozen version of you, move the copy to a new location, and revive the copy. (The reason I want to freeze you rather than simply anesthetize you is that I want there to be no possibility of any physical changes to your body or brain while you are unconscious.) Unless you are a dualist, you must concede that your external behavior after being revived must be the same in both scenarios. So any experiment we do on you must have the same outcome in both scenarios. So no experiment can determine whether your subjective sense of self is the same or different in the two scenarios.

Ha! As far as I can tell, this "me" and that "you" exchanging thoughts right now, are one offs, a delicate state, aware. One day, cloning, assumung we can do it in a non destrucrive way, and I am not convinced that will ever be true, would make another one. That one will diverge quickly from us as it's experiences would differ. I am not convinced it is possible to avoid that happening either. The transporter is such an interesting idea! But, using it would have to come with a bit different idea and acceptance of identity. The idea of a "me" continuing on, doing what I would have done, is plausible. The shared experiences make for a reality, also shared. That is where identity would lie. To understand if we are talking to a Kirk, post transport, our validation would basically be done with what is known, shared among those asking the question. It is all like sleeping, only to wonder if the same person awakens. In terms of a body holding a state, stream of experiences, yes. But, in terms of that person, as in would they pass the "talking to Kirk?" test, perhaps not. Ever meet someone after a coma, or even long surgery and experience a lack of congruence? Does not always happen, but it can. That is an example of that state being changed, yet the stream of experiences remaining intact. (As much as it can during times of long sleep, coma, and so forth)

squirrelicus 8y ago
Not to trivialize the great unsolved question of WTF is consciousness... I think it's a bit easier to reason about this problem than you think. For example, generally Star Trek wants us to presume the murder and cloning occur simultaneously. Let's say they don't. In the case that the murder occurs before the cloning, the waters are admittedly still muddy. Is it, in fact, like waking up from a sleep? Not very easy to tell. However, if we presume that the murder occurs after the cloning, things become quite clear. There can definitely only be one physical me in which I am conscious -- I feel comfortable rejecting an assertion that I would experience multiple simultaneous consciousnesses of a sequence of atomwise clones. Therefore, we work backwards. If I can't experience more than one consciousness simultaneously, then I can't experience two. If you clone me, I am not that clone, I am still the original. As the time between cloning and murdering (t) approaches zero, the same holds true. I am comfortable asserting there's nothing special about consciousness that would cause instantaneous consciousness transfer as (t) reaches zero and then becomes negative. Therefore a transporter clone will not be me from my perspective. Therefore the murder is my death, and the cloning is a birth of a new completely separate consciousness that I will never experience.
- lisper 8y ago
  > If I can't experience more than one consciousness simultaneously, then I can't experience two. One of you can't, but two of you might be able to :-) Kind of like how one core can't do real simultaneous multi-tasking, but two cores can.
  - squirrelicus 8y ago
    Right. From a purely material standpoint, I agree that from the outside perspective, there are two identical MEs and any claims to legitimacy, originality, or specialness will be completely dubious. But I think it's easy to demonstrate that it would not be like waking up and the "true original" would definitely die in that it would not experience the clone's consciousness
    - lisper 8y ago
      > it's easy to demonstrate that it would not be like waking up Really? How would you demonstrate that?
      - squirrelicus 8y ago
        If you do not believe the parent of your last comment does so I would like to hear your thoughts
        lisper 8y ago
        Imagine that we have the technology to cryogenically freeze and revive you with your subjective sense of self intact. Now consider two scenarios: Scenario 1: We freeze you, move your body to a different location, and revive you. Scenario 2: We freeze you, make an atomic copy of the frozen version of you, move the copy to a new location, and revive the copy. (The reason I want to freeze you rather than simply anesthetize you is that I want there to be no possibility of any physical changes to your body or brain while you are unconscious.) Unless you are a dualist, you must concede that your external behavior after being revived must be the same in both scenarios. So any experiment we do on you must have the same outcome in both scenarios. So no experiment can determine whether your subjective sense of self is the same or different in the two scenarios.