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You will still be able to measure how much data goes to and from particular IPs, since that can't be screened. TLS 1.3 approval doesn't stomp on SNI; on the co
by tialaramex 8y ago
You will still be able to measure how much data goes to and from particular IPs, since that can't be screened.
TLS 1.3 approval doesn't stomp on SNI; on the contrary, for the first time it actually makes SNI mandatory - in previous versions it was optional, leading to some HTTP implementations still not working with SNI late in the 21st century. I had a corporate Python system I was responsible for that couldn't do SNI even earlier this year.
You probably shouldn't attempt your idea of proxying everything. Proxies are very fragile, and this will probably inadvertently worsen your security, while also introducing weird non-security misbehaviour that's hard to track down. For example Firefox will go "Oh, a MITM proxy :(" and it will switch off all the safety measures built up over years for the public Internet because this isn't the public Internet. In principle if your MITM proxy is enforcing the same or tougher rules, this wouldn't be worse, but let's face it, you're going to cobble together the minimum possible to make it work.
Every time somebody tries to get fancy and _think_ about the bits inside the packets their network is supposed to be moving they screw up. That's the most cynical reason why there's an impetus to encrypt everything. If the bits are all encrypted gibberish the temptation to meddle with them goes away.
- ryanlol 8y ago>leading to some HTTP implementations still not working with SNI late in the 21st century So how did IPv6 adoption go?
- xg15 8y agoAnd yet a number of recent privacy breaches where apps were collecting and transmitting data they had no business in were discovered by sniffing the traffic. > Every time somebody tries to get fancy and _think_ about the bits inside the packets their network is supposed to be moving they screw up. How do you propose we do security otherwise? (Apart from delegating it to other parties so they think about the bits)
- wang_li 8y ago>How do you propose we do security otherwise? (Apart from delegating it to other parties so they think about the bits) The clear and obvious solution is to make developers, managers, executives, and major investors personally responsible for the damage their products do. If Google is going to encrypt everything using pinned certificates, making it impossible for me to implement security features/boundaries of my choice, then they should be 100% liable for all damages that come from the use of their products. Additionally, if an analysis of the problem shows that is is related to aspects of the product that do not directly related to what the end user believes the purpose of the product to be, then there should also be criminal liabilities for all parties as well.
- nemothekid 8y ago>The clear and obvious solution is to make developers, managers, executives, and major investors personally responsible for the damage their products do I struggle to understand how this is a "clear and obvious" solution. How would you go about executing this? Legislation? The big famous piece of recent tech legislation, GDPR, is, by most opinions, far and away "clear and obvious". And given the US's current political environment, I'd struggle to believe any sort of legislation could be passed that is "clear and obvious". There has to be a better solution that "coordinate the interests, incentives and motivations for millions of users, developers, managers, and executives to pass some legislation that makes the latter group responsible."
- deleted 8y ago[deleted]
- exikyut 8y ago> You will still be able to measure how much data goes to and from particular IPs, since that can't be screened. "33.12% of traffic went to IPs associated with Google. 26.3% of traffic went to IPs associated with CloudFlare. 25% of traffic went to Cloudfront. Here is the breakdown of the remaining 15.58%..." <Insert cartoon fist punching noises here> DO NOT WANT. Sorry for caps, it's a bit loud, but the above ^ is what I explicitly want to _avoid_. And with DoH (DNS-over-HTTPS) avoiding that will be even harder. > You probably shouldn't attempt your idea of proxying everything. Gestures at post and underlines angry and irritated parts (not angry at you of course, angry at TLS 1.3) I don't _want_ to build a proxy. Well, I do; I'd love to make it a firewalling proxy that only lets HTTPS data signed by my cert through (and resigns everything so only my cert is ever used), so it DOES break everything using cert pinning, and I can sniff ALL the data generated by the programs I use (if people argue about hardware ownership, shouldn't they argue even more vehemently about their personal information?!). But practically speaking, no, I don't want to build a proxy. I want to avoid needing to build a resilient LAN with multiple APs and subnets and firewalling and ugh. (Because I will of course need that to break HTTPS and then use my bank's website/apps without my heart fluttering - or even my Google login, for that matter...) > Proxies are very fragile, and this will probably inadvertently worsen your security, while also introducing weird non-security misbehaviour that's hard to track down. What do you mean? > For example Firefox will go "Oh, a MITM proxy :(" and it will switch off all the safety measures built up over years for the public Internet because this isn't the public Internet. Really?! Where can I learn more about this? :s > In principle if your MITM proxy is enforcing the same or tougher rules, this wouldn't be worse, but let's face it, you're going to cobble together the minimum possible to make it work. D: In practice you're right. In my head I want to build the best+most secure system available, but if I'm pragmatic, the amount of support out there for doing this on a personal/temporary (aka non-dev/"break the system for a minute because it's being debugged"/SSLKEYLOGFILE) basis is about the same as for GPG-encrypted mail, so I know I'll wear down eventually, and make myself a giant sitting duck. :'( > Every time somebody tries to get fancy and _think_ about the bits inside the packets their network is supposed to be moving they screw up. That's the most cynical reason why there's an impetus to encrypt everything. If the bits are all encrypted gibberish the temptation to meddle with them goes away. Thanks for this. I never looked at it that way, but thinking about all the programs and apps using weird binary formats to scare people away... it makes perfect sense the Internet and HTTPS would work similarly. But I think that's a vulnerability in and of itself, in that it discourages general exploration and progressive investigative analysis by virtue of being so unbelievably multidimensional and hard. For example I look at https://sites.google.com/site/testsitehacking/-36k-google-app-engine-rce https://sites.google.com/site/testsitehacking/-36k-google-ap... and wonder.