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> "Doing so would put our traditional customers at risk as it would mask banned traffic behind their domains." > Note that their explanation of why they killed
by viraptor 8y ago
> "Doing so would put our traditional customers at risk as it would mask banned traffic behind their domains."
> Note that their explanation of why they killed it would also apply to encrypted SNI.
I'd say that's an interesting interpretation. What they likely meant is that if govs/orgs want to block X and X starts using domain fronting via domain Y, there's a chance Y starts getting blocked. (basic SNI/DNS filtering) The same idea does not apply to the encrypted SNI - there's no damage to a random domain, unless the whole provider range gets blocked.
- repolfx 8y agoBut the circumvention can use any domain and switch repeatedly, or dump lots of them using various techniques and randomly select. It doesn't need to be the case that domain Y is static. In particular, note that encrypted SNI could just be blocked at the network level, thus forcing fallback to regular old TLS. But domain fronting can't be blocked like that.
- viraptor 8y ago> It doesn't need to be the case that domain Y is static. That's true, but I don't think it's relevant to what the providers want to prevent. Even if the domain changes based on some pool, if Y is used at some point, Y could be blocked as a collateral damage. Since Y pays the provider, the provider cares about them not being blocked because of a functionality they enable.