I suspect the problem with Snap specifically is less the user plateau itself, and more that it changes the discussion about profitability and value. As long as

I suspect the problem with Snap specifically is less the user plateau itself, and more that it changes the discussion about profitability and value. As long as the user base is growing exponentially, most questions about valuation and revenue can be hand-waved away. It's a bit dot-com boom still, maybe crossed with a too-big-to-fail mindset, but if the CEO says "our service has 2 billion users, growing 10% quarterly" that still pacifies a lot of investors without any further concern about revenue-per-user. If you've got enough eyeballs, somehow money materializes. Once we figure out that, say, "Peak Snapchat is 180 million users +/-10%", it becomes a lot more quantifiable to figure out "each user had to generate $23.45 of value per month to justify the company's valuation." And that means asking hard questions about the business. As for long-term and short-term investments, the more I think about it, the more the "technical debt" concept seems like it has real value for thinking about companies. A lot of firms take on the corporate equivalent of technical debt all over the place. Deferring maintenance or extending equipment lifecycles, cutting back on training programs that yield cheap promote-from-within employees. Renting knowledge they should own (excessive consultancy and third-party service providers). It always comes back to "let's polish some stuff in the short term, and if we're lucky it won't hurt our long term viability too much." A focus on maximum dividends is likely being bought with at least some technical debt. Of course, this type of debt never appears on a balance sheet for investors.