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We have RIPE and other IANA organizations that have routing objects in their databases with information about through which ASN certain classes are announced, t

We have RIPE and other IANA organizations that have routing objects in their databases with information about through which ASN certain classes are announced, there are also LOAs. GTT and Cogent are huge Tier-1 providers, why they do not check which classes their clients are announcing? Am I missing something here?

walrus01 8y ago
Many big ISPs are quite diligent about what blocks their downstream customers announce. If you're an NTT ip transit customer every new block you announce to them is vetted. They have a high degree of automation with IRR integration but also humans in the loop. Any asshole can theoretically make a fraudulent LOA, but by producing one to an upstream a hijack factory opens itself up to criminal charges of fraud and forgery.
msumpter 8y ago
According to a post by Job on nanog they have been known to submitted false or fabricated IRR information to RADB and RIPE: http://seclists.org/nanog/2018/Jun/379 http://seclists.org/nanog/2018/Jun/379 At the end of the day, BGP is a very trusting protocol and it requires keeping the neighborhood clean and clear. IMO providers should be filtering prefixes their clients shouldn't be announcing (al la BCP38) but keeping up on the various IP blocks being shifted around is a paperwork nightmare I'm sure.
- walrus01 8y ago
  BGP is still very much built on trust and reputation... At a local ix level if you were to show up at an ix like the ams-ix and regularly announce prefixes you have no right to, your company name and AS# would quickly develop the reputation of a rancid turd.
  - im3w1l 8y ago
    The BGP authentication method doesn't seem very secure, so how do you know who you are trusting?
    - walrus01 8y ago
      a properly implemented IX has MAC address filtering on ports. This can of course be spoofed. But there is also a level of security at OSI layer 1 for the physical fiber cross connect from an ISP's panel to the IX's panel. For instance: If the IX is located on the 15th floor of the building. An ISP might be colocated on the 12th floor. Fiber XC from 12.501.P4.D4 (12th floor, row 5, rack 01, fiber patch panel 4, SC duplex port D4) to 15.201.P1.D4, then a fiber cable from D4 to an SFP+ port on the IX's switch. Unless somebody physically hijacks your fiber crossconnect and moves it (which would be noticed as hard down immediately) it's pretty hard to pretend to be another ISP, from the perspective of the switch fabric operator of the IX.
    - lormayna 8y ago
      There is no real need for BGP authentication: if you want to create a peer relathionship, it need to be configured on both routers, then there is a native trust relationship.
madsushi 8y ago
One note: not all IP addresses are handled by RIPE/ARIN/etc. There are legacy allocations which are not subject to any agreements and are the property of the owners.

walrus01 8y ago

Many big ISPs are quite diligent about what blocks their downstream customers announce. If you're an NTT ip transit customer every new block you announce to them is vetted. They have a high degree of automation with IRR integration but also humans in the loop. Any asshole can theoretically make a fraudulent LOA, but by producing one to an upstream a hijack factory opens itself up to criminal charges of fraud and forgery.

msumpter 8y ago

According to a post by Job on nanog they have been known to submitted false or fabricated IRR information to RADB and RIPE: http://seclists.org/nanog/2018/Jun/379 http://seclists.org/nanog/2018/Jun/379 At the end of the day, BGP is a very trusting protocol and it requires keeping the neighborhood clean and clear. IMO providers should be filtering prefixes their clients shouldn't be announcing (al la BCP38) but keeping up on the various IP blocks being shifted around is a paperwork nightmare I'm sure.

walrus01 8y ago
BGP is still very much built on trust and reputation... At a local ix level if you were to show up at an ix like the ams-ix and regularly announce prefixes you have no right to, your company name and AS# would quickly develop the reputation of a rancid turd.
- im3w1l 8y ago
  The BGP authentication method doesn't seem very secure, so how do you know who you are trusting?
  - walrus01 8y ago
    a properly implemented IX has MAC address filtering on ports. This can of course be spoofed. But there is also a level of security at OSI layer 1 for the physical fiber cross connect from an ISP's panel to the IX's panel. For instance: If the IX is located on the 15th floor of the building. An ISP might be colocated on the 12th floor. Fiber XC from 12.501.P4.D4 (12th floor, row 5, rack 01, fiber patch panel 4, SC duplex port D4) to 15.201.P1.D4, then a fiber cable from D4 to an SFP+ port on the IX's switch. Unless somebody physically hijacks your fiber crossconnect and moves it (which would be noticed as hard down immediately) it's pretty hard to pretend to be another ISP, from the perspective of the switch fabric operator of the IX.
  - lormayna 8y ago
    There is no real need for BGP authentication: if you want to create a peer relathionship, it need to be configured on both routers, then there is a native trust relationship.

madsushi 8y ago

One note: not all IP addresses are handled by RIPE/ARIN/etc. There are legacy allocations which are not subject to any agreements and are the property of the owners.